On a different note, we had another set of amazing papers in the Political Economy of the French Revolution session, which I was pleased to chair with @pmaneuvre.bsky.social

What a pleasure to chair a fantastic session on advanced methods at the WEHC in Lund with @cedricchambru.bsky.social — and to learn about fancy work in NLP, census linking, and more!

Beyond this historical context, our findings resonate with current issues: raising taxes can lead to political backlash in states with weak fiscal capacity and legitimacy—sometimes even in established fiscal states, as evidenced by the recent French Yellow Vest protests.

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What would have been the impact on government revenue if the price of salt in the high-tax region had been reduced to the highest conflict-free price? We use a methodology from a top finance official of the time, Jacques Necker, to derive a counterfactual revenue.

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We find that the effect of tax enforcement on conflict increases with salt price differences at the border. This relationship allows us to determine the highest price differential that does not trigger conflict.

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These conflicts persisted until the French Revolution, when the salt tax was finally repealed. In 1789, it was also by far the most contested tax in popular grievances—especially in the high-tax region.

🧵7/11

The reform led to a 20-fold increase in salt smuggling conflicts in the high-tax region: not just direct confrontations between smugglers and tax agents, but the local population also standing with the smugglers against state repression!

🧵6/11

The French state relied heavily on the salt tax (gabelle), which caused salt prices to vary dramatically across regions. This disparity led to widespread illicit salt smuggling from lower-tax regions to the high-tax central region.

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