Christian Traxler
@chtraxler.bsky.social
Prof of Economics @ Hertie School & BSoE Berlin | Public Econ, Applied Micro, Behavioral | Law #Enforcement, #TaxEvasion, Transportation Policy | #FirstGen
https://www.hertie-school.org/traxler
https://www.hertie-school.org/traxler
Exactly, no (quasi-)experiment in here.
September 25, 2025 at 9:33 AM
Exactly, no (quasi-)experiment in here.
CC seems like bsky didn't get your handle, @libordusekeu.bsky.social sry
July 21, 2025 at 5:23 PM
CC seems like bsky didn't get your handle, @libordusekeu.bsky.social sry
PS: In related work (same setting), we do NOT find clear evidence that higher #fines would amplify (specific) #deterrence effects – it’s about getting a ticket (or not), which makes drivers slow down... low/high fines seem 2nd order 👇
ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec...
(5/5)
ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec...
(5/5)
Learning from Law Enforcement
This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving hi
ideas.repec.org
July 21, 2025 at 10:01 AM
PS: In related work (same setting), we do NOT find clear evidence that higher #fines would amplify (specific) #deterrence effects – it’s about getting a ticket (or not), which makes drivers slow down... low/high fines seem 2nd order 👇
ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec...
(5/5)
ideas.repec.org/a/oup/jeurec...
(5/5)
Given that (non-)compliance responses are small, the elasticity of revenues wrt fines is high (~0.9): a 100CZK increase in fines translates into ~60CZK higher revenues collected (within 15 days).
Might explain why "revenue motivated" authorities find fines attractive.
(4/5)
Might explain why "revenue motivated" authorities find fines attractive.
(4/5)
July 21, 2025 at 10:01 AM
Given that (non-)compliance responses are small, the elasticity of revenues wrt fines is high (~0.9): a 100CZK increase in fines translates into ~60CZK higher revenues collected (within 15 days).
Might explain why "revenue motivated" authorities find fines attractive.
(4/5)
Might explain why "revenue motivated" authorities find fines attractive.
(4/5)
A 10% increase in the fine (= payment obligation) results in a 1pp drop in timely payments (timely = within 15 days after receiving a speeding ticket).
The semi-elasticity is close to what we found in earlier work in the context of TV license fees 👇
ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps...
(3/5)
The semi-elasticity is close to what we found in earlier work in the context of TV license fees 👇
ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps...
(3/5)
Higher Taxes, More Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentia
This paper studies the evasion of TV license fees in Austria. We exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion. Comparing municipalities at the low- and high-fee side of state
ideas.repec.org
July 21, 2025 at 10:01 AM
A 10% increase in the fine (= payment obligation) results in a 1pp drop in timely payments (timely = within 15 days after receiving a speeding ticket).
The semi-elasticity is close to what we found in earlier work in the context of TV license fees 👇
ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps...
(3/5)
The semi-elasticity is close to what we found in earlier work in the context of TV license fees 👇
ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps...
(3/5)
