Hereby confirming that I’ve also been honored 😀 Thanks again for the great collaboration, @adridelrio.bsky.social and @plutscher.bsky.social !

48 chapters on various aspects of Norwegian politics. Including one by @sirianned.bsky.social and myself on the historical development and current state of Norwegian democracy:

global.oup.com/academic/pro...

Are regimes with higher nr's of core supporters more durable? Are regimes with more diverse coalitions of supporters more durable?

In this (published today) @cpsjournal.bsky.social article, @sirianned.bsky.social , @magnusrasmussen.bsky.social , and @torewig.bsky.social I answer "Yes" to both Qs.

Does higher state capacity go together with lower risk of democratic breakdown? Many political scientists certainly believe so!

Yet, in an article just published in @polstudies.bsky.social , David Andersen, @skaaning.bsky.social and I highlight important nuances to this general relationship.

Lenin's theory of imperialism & capitalist peace theory sound like strange bed-fellows, but @torewig.bsky.social , @sirianned.bsky.social, @magnusrasmussen.bsky.social & I integrate them in this article.

Published today in @ejir.bsky.social! On business elites in politics & international conflict

And, the social groups entering coalitions have changed over time: In the 19th century, landowners and aristocrats were frequent support groups. Gradually, but at diff't points in time for diff't world regions, they've become far less frequent. “New” social groups has emerged as key support groups.

We also discuss global trends such as the considerable increase in avg. coalition size across the world since WWII. This increase, in large part, stems from democratization in many countries, but also in large part from the increase in avg. regime support coalitions in autocracies over time.

For example, dominant party regimes do tend to have larger support coalitions, on average, than personalist regimes or military regimes, as often assumed in the autocratic politics literature. But, our data indicates considerable variation also within the standard regime categories.

In addition to describing and assessing the validity of the measures, we present several applications. We, e.g., describe differences and similarities across regimes in who their key supporters and opponents are, as well as notable trends in regime support coalitions across modern history.

Our data paper on the Regime Support and Opposition Groups data was just published in @bjpols.bsky.social !

Co-authored with @sirianned.bsky.social , @magnusrasmussen.bsky.social and @torewig.bsky.social

Here comes a relatively long thread (as is appropriate for a long-term project)

Opposition mobilizing in the streets can spur regime change via different channels such as revolutions or coups. But also indirectly through pushing OR enabling sitting regime elites to change the regime «from within» in (very!) different manners.

@vldjuve.bsky.social and my new JCR article👇

Exciting to be on CNN yesterday, talking about insights from earlier work on elections in autocracies with Håvard Mokleiv Nygård and @torewig.bsky.social.

Also seems like a good opportunity to promote the original article: www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

Check out @kailmarkvart.bsky.social ‘s 🧵and our (open access) article on democracy measurement and global democratic backsliding.

It’s published online today alongside several others in a larger symposium in @pspolisci.bsky.social

Just in time for ( polisky )Christmas:

The paperback version of «Why democracies develop and decline».

Excited to have this paper forthcoming in World Politics (🥳), and very grateful to get to co-author with @palinakolvani.bsky.social — this was a particularly fun project to work with :)

polisky dictatorsky

I ukens Forskningsfronten i Morgenbladet skriver jeg om et av de mest spennende spørsmålene jeg vet om — det kompliserte forholdet mellom demokrati og ulikhet — og en ny artikkel av Lasse Leipziger som bidrar til å belyse dette spørsmålet.

matter extra for mitigating downside risk (which can be considerable in these often politicized sectors with large sunk investments, making it ripe for expropriation or at least "contract re-negotiations"). In the paper, we, e.g., write that:

Do state-owned multinational enterprises invest more in corrupt, expropriating & otherwise “politically risky” countries compared to private MNEs? If so, why?

Asmund Rygh & my study – just published in Multinational Business Review – addresses these Qs using data on Norwegian MNEs' FDI, 1990-2006 🧵