https://sites.google.com/view/bengrodeck
I feel very fortunate to be an academic and can't wait to teach, as well as continue conducting research at a place with such a rich history in Experimental Econ.
#econsky
I feel very fortunate to be an academic and can't wait to teach, as well as continue conducting research at a place with such a rich history in Experimental Econ.
#econsky
1. Participants significantly more like to contribute to future generations. 📈
2. Participants keep significantly less for themselves (more cooperation overall) 📈
1. Participants significantly more like to contribute to future generations. 📈
2. Participants keep significantly less for themselves (more cooperation overall) 📈
The only difference is that transfers to Account B go to a participant from the previous generation. This creates the possibility of intergenerational exchange.
In both treatments players get zero information on other players' decisions.
The only difference is that transfers to Account B go to a participant from the previous generation. This creates the possibility of intergenerational exchange.
In both treatments players get zero information on other players' decisions.
This represents the classical intergenerational decision problem. The Decision Maker can allocate resources to the future generation (Account C), to someone in the current generation (Account B), or keep it for themselves.
This represents the classical intergenerational decision problem. The Decision Maker can allocate resources to the future generation (Account C), to someone in the current generation (Account B), or keep it for themselves.
- Players make an allocation decision with some chance the next generation exists, and some chance that the game will end.
- Players make an allocation decision with some chance the next generation exists, and some chance that the game will end.
Problem: Altruism alone isn't enough to sufficiently invest in future generations.
We find: Allowing for cooperation with both the previous generation (as well as the future generation) increases investment in future generations.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Problem: Altruism alone isn't enough to sufficiently invest in future generations.
We find: Allowing for cooperation with both the previous generation (as well as the future generation) increases investment in future generations.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
Leaves immediately*
Leaves immediately*
If you donate, i'll add on an extra $20 to your donation.
Thanks so much for doing good!
www.givingwhatwecan.org/fundraisers/...
If you donate, i'll add on an extra $20 to your donation.
Thanks so much for doing good!
www.givingwhatwecan.org/fundraisers/...
Looking forward to having the opportunity to talk about my JMP on 'Repugnant Markets' (first image), as well as my other research projects.
Please don't hesitate to reach out if you want to know more!
Looking forward to having the opportunity to talk about my JMP on 'Repugnant Markets' (first image), as well as my other research projects.
Please don't hesitate to reach out if you want to know more!
The TLDR:
- Information Asymmetry is a problem in buyer/seller markets.
- Our simple mechanism introduces psychological costs for defection.
- Buyers' trust 📈
- Sellers' cooperation 📈
- Market efficiency 📈
The TLDR:
- Information Asymmetry is a problem in buyer/seller markets.
- Our simple mechanism introduces psychological costs for defection.
- Buyers' trust 📈
- Sellers' cooperation 📈
- Market efficiency 📈
I feel so privileged to be working with this amazing group of researchers!
You can check out who we are and what we work on here:
web.evolbio.mpg.de/social-behav...
I feel so privileged to be working with this amazing group of researchers!
You can check out who we are and what we work on here:
web.evolbio.mpg.de/social-behav...