evan
@beingandslime.bsky.social
the bluey sky above me, the blual law within me
Read the full paper here!
philpapers.org/rec/ODOQFB
philpapers.org/rec/ODOQFB
Evan O'Donnell, _Quid Facti_ Between Kant and Maimon - PhilPapers
There is substantial scholarship concerning the origin and use of the question “quid facti” in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. There is also substantial scholarship concerning the question in the wor...
philpapers.org
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
Read the full paper here!
philpapers.org/rec/ODOQFB
philpapers.org/rec/ODOQFB
Most commentators think Maimon's quid facti depends on his hyper-rationalist commitments, but I argue that this isn't true. I formulate a version of the quid facti that should concern any transcendental argument.
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
Most commentators think Maimon's quid facti depends on his hyper-rationalist commitments, but I argue that this isn't true. I formulate a version of the quid facti that should concern any transcendental argument.
So the difference stems from two different aspects of one and the same legal phenomenon, but the outcomes end up looking pretty different! I end the paper with a discussion of the Maimonian quid facti's prospects as a standalone skeptical challenge
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
So the difference stems from two different aspects of one and the same legal phenomenon, but the outcomes end up looking pretty different! I end the paper with a discussion of the Maimonian quid facti's prospects as a standalone skeptical challenge
The reasons he thinks this are pretty simple: non-a priori explanations (like Humean ones) give perfectly workable explanations of all the phenomena Kant thinks are a priori! Given this, it's unclear to Maimon why we should think that the claims are genuinely a priori at all
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
The reasons he thinks this are pretty simple: non-a priori explanations (like Humean ones) give perfectly workable explanations of all the phenomena Kant thinks are a priori! Given this, it's unclear to Maimon why we should think that the claims are genuinely a priori at all
In fact, I show that Maimon thinks that, in the case of empirical cognition, such claims are *not* made, and this is the core of his quid facti objection
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
In fact, I show that Maimon thinks that, in the case of empirical cognition, such claims are *not* made, and this is the core of his quid facti objection
For Maimon, though, this aspect becomes incredibly important in the transcendental context: if we're trying to justify a priori claims, it's not always possible if such claims are being made.
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
For Maimon, though, this aspect becomes incredibly important in the transcendental context: if we're trying to justify a priori claims, it's not always possible if such claims are being made.
Second, though, there was the question of whether a claim was made at all. In the legal context, this point is mostly moot--if you're in a lawsuit, the claim has obviously been made.
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
Second, though, there was the question of whether a claim was made at all. In the legal context, this point is mostly moot--if you're in a lawsuit, the claim has obviously been made.
First, there was figuring out how exactly what happened happened—and this is how Kant understands the question. For transcendental claims, he thinks this is interesting but ultimately unimportant—a psychological process with little bearing on whether or not those claims are true
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
First, there was figuring out how exactly what happened happened—and this is how Kant understands the question. For transcendental claims, he thinks this is interesting but ultimately unimportant—a psychological process with little bearing on whether or not those claims are true
I start with the legal context of the quid facti, as part of the "deduktionschriften" that Kant based his deduction on. In those documents, the quid facti involved the "facts of the case," but I show that that task was broken up into a few different sub-tasks in practice
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
I start with the legal context of the quid facti, as part of the "deduktionschriften" that Kant based his deduction on. In those documents, the quid facti involved the "facts of the case," but I show that that task was broken up into a few different sub-tasks in practice
Scholars have mainly come at the quid facti from either the Kant or Maimon side, but I try to figure out how the two of them could understand the same question so differently
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
Scholars have mainly come at the quid facti from either the Kant or Maimon side, but I try to figure out how the two of them could understand the same question so differently
Maimon says that the "quid facti" is the most important skeptical challenge to Kant's system, but Kant talks about the quid facti too, and he doesn't care about it at all! What gives?
October 29, 2025 at 3:41 AM
Maimon says that the "quid facti" is the most important skeptical challenge to Kant's system, but Kant talks about the quid facti too, and he doesn't care about it at all! What gives?
as an optimist, I believe that it is genuinely possible for one of the more skilled psychologists in the profession to explain what the question "is virtue worth pursuing?" means
August 26, 2025 at 3:31 PM
as an optimist, I believe that it is genuinely possible for one of the more skilled psychologists in the profession to explain what the question "is virtue worth pursuing?" means
your paper is great, and I'm very glad it exists to make clear what would otherwise be a very tangled discussion around deleuze's naturalism! was thrilled to discover it
July 25, 2025 at 3:51 PM
your paper is great, and I'm very glad it exists to make clear what would otherwise be a very tangled discussion around deleuze's naturalism! was thrilled to discover it
check out the full a rticle here!
philpapers.org/rec/ODODEO
philpapers.org/rec/ODODEO
Evan O'Donnell, Deleuze's Epistemology of Inquiry - PhilPapers
In this paper, I propose to describe Deleuze’s theory of knowledge as set out in Difference & Repetition. First, I show that despite Deleuze’s hostility towards a knowledge-centered approach to philos...
philpapers.org
July 22, 2025 at 5:29 PM
check out the full a rticle here!
philpapers.org/rec/ODODEO
philpapers.org/rec/ODODEO
deleuze goes the opposite way. first he defines what it means to have a "problem" & "question," & then "knowledge" is downstream: just a "settled solution" to a problem. a cogent & underappreciated account that happens to largely parallel normative epistemology's direction today
July 22, 2025 at 5:29 PM
deleuze goes the opposite way. first he defines what it means to have a "problem" & "question," & then "knowledge" is downstream: just a "settled solution" to a problem. a cogent & underappreciated account that happens to largely parallel normative epistemology's direction today
deleuze's issue is that epistemology defines knowledge first & takes every other part of the process to be a deficient reflection of that ultimate state. which may sound familiar if you're aware of the zetetic turn in analytic epistemology... deleuze wants to talk inquiring!
July 22, 2025 at 5:29 PM
deleuze's issue is that epistemology defines knowledge first & takes every other part of the process to be a deficient reflection of that ultimate state. which may sound familiar if you're aware of the zetetic turn in analytic epistemology... deleuze wants to talk inquiring!
it's not a major point of emphasis for him, but it's not right to read a lack of focus as hostility. concentrating on D&R, I draw out a deleuzian theory of knowledge from deleuze's own brief remarks on the subject.
July 22, 2025 at 5:29 PM
it's not a major point of emphasis for him, but it's not right to read a lack of focus as hostility. concentrating on D&R, I draw out a deleuzian theory of knowledge from deleuze's own brief remarks on the subject.
if you're at all familiar with english secondary lit on deleuze, you might find the idea of a deleuzian epistemology kind of surprising. deleuzians are always saying stuff like "deleuze hates epistemology" and "deleuze is opposed to knowledge." but I don't think that's true!
July 22, 2025 at 5:29 PM
if you're at all familiar with english secondary lit on deleuze, you might find the idea of a deleuzian epistemology kind of surprising. deleuzians are always saying stuff like "deleuze hates epistemology" and "deleuze is opposed to knowledge." but I don't think that's true!
there is truth at the core of the intuition-based way of doing philosophy but it's a truth you'd think philosophers would be a bit less cavalier about admitting
June 3, 2025 at 11:52 PM
there is truth at the core of the intuition-based way of doing philosophy but it's a truth you'd think philosophers would be a bit less cavalier about admitting