Smith is one of several American public thought leaders who in their cackhanded projection provide a useful indicator of the anxieties eating away at the US policy elite

I don't think that is an issue. You could even integrate the UK fully into the Single Market with guillotine clauses if London messes around without it affecting much if Farage wins. It's only a problem if the UK is a full member, which is why it shouldn't be one

And as ever, when criticising the UK it is crucial to understand that FCDO and trade negotiators are not the problem here. There is only so much they can do when it comes to Downing Street indecision and Treasury monomania.

The UK Treasury always had a grudge Erasmus costs, but allowing that penny-pinching shortsightedness and paranoia about youth mobility legislation get in the way of big symbolic moves that can help get UK gains on SPS and carbon tax talks where serious money is involved is not smart

1. There will be a deal once key EU actors have bandwidth for it and the UK accepts that conceding on some issues gets gains on others
2. As a non-member the UK will always also be a bargaining chip in internal EU horsetrading. London moaning about that won't change it
bsky.app/profile/davi...

Not sure that's in the loop with key actors shaping China policy in places like Wolfsburg, Turin, Toulouse or Prague

I think it's becoming a fascinating case study in the limits of US as well as Chinese geopolitical power

It's what bothered me about the OP. EU and US stances towards China did not evolve in a vacuum. They crucially interacted with Japanese, Indian, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Australian, Philippines etc etc responses to the Jiang and Hu eras

In all these debates it is crucial to centre geoeconomic and geopolitical interests of local and regional actors counterbalancing against a wannabe (in this case Chinese) hegemon. Just looking at a US lens obscures as much as it reveals

Vietnam is an example. VCP tries to maintain strong party ties with CCP and sustain good trade relations with China, yet there is also nationalist public suspicion and military expansion in the SCS as insurance policy against Beijing. Before Trump this provided points of convergence with US stances

Keep in mind it is worth looking at the NatSec dimension beyond a US-centric lens. China's repositioning is also viewed as a geopolitical threat by many Asia-Pacific states that benefited from its rise, and are using growing prosperity driven by China to invest in military defence against it