Full paper here & comments are very welcome: osf.io/preprints/so...

In line w/ the idea of experience-based accountablity, we find that in areas with less prior insurance instability, voters reward the incumbent, but not in those with high instability. W/ surveys, we also show that voters in these areas are more certain (and more critical) of the Gov's performance.

Using a diff-in-diff around eligible vs. ineligible areas outside fire perimeters, we find precisely estimated null effects on support for both the governor and the insurance commissioner, despite evidence that the policy reduced nonrenewals, raised house prices, and was salient.

We put forward a framework of experience-based accountability, where voters evaluate policies based on their previous experience with the policy area. That sets the sufficiency standard and crystallises opinions.

We study short-term regulatory adaptation: one-year post-wildfire insurance moratoria in California that stop insurers from dropping homeowners, a temporary rule that buffers households from climate risks.