Jack Goldsmith on "A Dishonorable Strike"

11/29/2004: Randy Barnett argues Gonzales v. Raich. Randy Barnett argues Gonzales v. Raich   The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 29, 2004 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

What’s on your mind?

From the Joint Pre-Trial Memorandum in McQuade v. UMass Memorial Health Care, Inc., the plaintiff's position: In the summer of 2020, a position at UMass Memorial's Heart Vascular Interventional Lab commonly known as the Cath lab opened. Mr. McQuade and Andrews both applied for the Cath lab position. Ms. Andrews was awarded the Cath lab position. Once Mr. McQuade learned that Ms. Andrews was awarded the Cath lab position, he reached out to his union representatives for advice. Mr. McQuade's Massachusetts Nurses Association ("MNA") union representatives … both advised that Mr. McQuade should file a grievance because he had seniority over Andrews, and had the requisite experience to work in the Cath lab. Ultimately, on September 11, 2020, Mr. McQuade was successful in his grievance and was awarded the Cath lab position. This, in turn, caused Andrews to leave the Cath lab position and return to her previous position in the float pool. Andrews was angry that she had to return to the float pool. Andrews desperately wanted to stay in the Cath lab and filed her own counter grievance that was eventually denied at the "step 3" stage by UMass Memorial. Therefore, the only way Andrews could be able to return to the Cath lab would be if a position opened by resignation or otherwise, including the resignation of Mr. McQuade…. The Nurse Defendants are all friends and would frequently socialize outside of work together. Mr. McQuade expects the evidence will show that, the Nurse Defendants did the unthinkable, and started a vile, and frankly evil slander campaign against Mr. McQuade, in an effort to have him resign from the Cath lab, so the Nurse Defendants could all work together again. Specifically, the Nurse Defendants began spreading defamatory rumors around UMass Memorial that stated Mr. McQuade abused his wife and child and had an open DCF investigation against him. Further, Clark stated that Mr. McQuade "created a farm in [his] back yard in order to lure in children as [his] prey." {Q: "Okay. And the allegations concerning Mr. McQuade were a child abuse and spousal abuse. By spousal abuse, specifically, did you mean that he hit his wife?" Mr. Spezzaferro: "I think the way it was put to me was that he hits his wife." Q: "Were you aware of any statements circulating around the hospital relating to Mr. McQuade and child abuse? Ms. Baer: Objection. Ms. O'Rourke: Yes." … Ms. O'Rourke: "Basically that there are statements being made by Ms. Andrews, and Ms. Clark, and Ms. Spratt while—about Patrick's child being taken away by DCF and the alleged child abuse."} The abhorrent slander became widespread throughout UMass Memorial…. Because Andrews was in the float pool, the defamation was easily spread as she "floated" from unit-to-unit slandering Mr. McQuade…. The rampant defamation became so widespread that Ms. Champagne, took a huge professional risk and decided she needed to go to HR. Accordingly, Ms. Hiza met with Ms. Champagne and Mr. Spezzaferro on the afternoon of November 19, 2020. Ms. Hiza took contemporaneous notes of the meeting, as part of the regular course of her job, that stated, in pertinent part, the following: … [Andrews] said fuck him—he took my job—he's big and scary He's [Mr. McQuade] lazy a hard piece of shit He's [Mr. McQuade] abusive and knows how to use guns DSS [DCF] case—abusive daughter—he's abusive Yeah, she keeps—about this within 7ICU. They are her friends. Character assassination She [Andrews] was on 3ICU all weekend carrying on about Patrick. After the meeting with Ms. Champagne, fully aware of the extent of the defamation, Ms. Hiza and other UMass Memorial HR staff investigated the defamation. Eventually UMass Memorial HR staff and Ms. Hiza met with the Nurse Defendants. Aware of the slander campaign, UMass Memorial, during work hours, instructed each Nurse Defendant to stop the defamation. Importantly, after the investigation, Ms. Hiza and UMass Memorial HR could not conclude that defamation was not occurring…. UMass terminated him for alleged sexual misconduct against another nurse, … McCarthy … who was friends with the Nurse Defendants. UMass Memorial had a written investigatory report when it terminated Mr. McQuade. In the written report Mr. McQuade complained thathe believed he was retaliated against by McCarthy because of the defamation. McCarthy also brought criminal charges against Mr. McQuade. At trial, Mr. McQuade was found not guilty of a sexually related felony against McCarthy. The defendants' position: Defendants respectfully submit that Mr. McQuade has no admissible evidence that will show that he was the subject of any defamatory statements by any of the Nurse Defendants. Specifically, Plaintiff has no admissible evidence to prove: when the alleged defamatory statements were made, how the alleged defamatory statements we made, where the alleged defamatory statements were made, or to whom the alleged defamatory statements were made. Moreover, Plaintiff has waivered on what he has alleged to be the contents of the allegedly defamatory statements. The reason for Plaintiffs lack of evidence is clear: no statements were made. Rather, Plaintiff—who was mentally "spiraling" in 2020—was the one who told multiple people working for UMass Memorial that there were defamatory statements said about him (i.e., he was the one that spread stories of the alleged defamatory statements). Not one person can or will testify that they heard any of the Nurse Defendants make any statement about Plaintiff. After Plaintiff brought his accusations to UMass Memorial's Human Resources, the allegations were promptly investigated and not substantiated. The evidence will show that Plaintiff's employment was terminated because he sexually assaulted a nurse (not one of the Nurse Defendants) and was criminally charged and convicted for the conduct. Plaintiffs relocated by his own choice after he was criminally charged, which is unrelated to Plaintiff's claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. [According to a Nov. 21 article about the defamation case in the Worcester Telegram & Gazette (Toni Caushi), McQuade had been fired "following sexual allegations by a nurse; he was found guilty in October 2022 on an annoying and accosting charge—a non-sexual misdemeanor" and "found not guilty for an 'indecent assault and battery charge.'" -EV] Earlier this month, the jury concluded that plaintiff hadn't proved his case against Clark (which I assume means it didn't believe she made the "created a farm in [his] back yard in order to lure in children as [his] prey" claim), but did prove that Andrews had defamed him. The jury awarded McQuade $100 in actual damages against Andrews, and $75K against UMass Memorial, to which the court added $40K in interest. The post $115K Defamation Verdict Over Workplace Accusations of Domestic Abuse appeared first on Reason.com.

From a Justice Department statement issued Nov. 7, but just posted on Westlaw: Zimnako Salah, 46, of Phoenix, Arizona, was sentenced today in the Eastern District of California to six years in prison in connection with his plot targeting Christian churches. In March 2025, a jury in Sacramento convicted Salah of strapping a backpack around the toilet of a Christian church in Roseville, with the intent to convey a hoax bomb threat and to obstruct the free exercise of religion of the congregants who worshipped there. The jury's verdict included a special finding that Salah targeted the church because of the religion of the people who worshipped there, making the offense a hate crime. According to the evidence at trial, from September to November of 2023, Salah traveled to four Christian churches in Arizona, California, and Colorado, wearing black backpacks. At two of those churches, Salah planted those backpacks, placing congregants in fear that they contained bombs. At the other two churches, Salah was confronted by security before he got the chance to plant those backpacks. While Salah had been making bomb threats by planting backpacks in Christian churches, he had been building a bomb capable of fitting in a backpack. During a search of his storage unit, an FBI Bomb Technician seized items that an FBI Bomb Expert testified at trial served as component parts of an improvised explosive device (IED). A search of Salah's social media records revealed that he had consumed extremist propaganda online. Specifically, those records showed that Salah had searched for videos of "Infidels dying," and he had watched videos depicting ISIS terrorists murdering people. In a cellphone video taken days before the crimes of conviction, Defendant Salah declared, "America. We are going to destroy it." … "Salah's seeming ultimate goal to bomb a Christian church would have resulted in many deaths and injuries if his plan had not been thwarted," said U.S. Attorney Eric Grant. "Thanks to the action of church security, local law enforcement, and the FBI, this defendant was stopped before he had a chance to carry out the crimes he sought to commit. Today's sentence is justified by the history and characteristics of this defendant and serves to protect the public from this defendant. And it affirms that people of all religions should be able to worship freely and exercise their First Amendment rights in this country without fear of violence." … From the government's Sentencing Memorandum: A cellphone video, dated November 10, 2023—two days before the crimes of conviction in Roseville, California—shows Defendant Salah outside a Christian church in San Francisco, California, with a black backpack. Defendant Salah points to an American flag and says, "Fuck that flag," and "America—we're going to destroy it." His statements on that video are consistent with statements he made to another witness, A.R., months earlier. When Defendant Salah observed A.R. wearing a hat with the American flag on it, Defendant Salah exclaimed "fuck this country" and "I hate America," elaborating that he was angry with the U.S. military for bombing and killing Iraqis. A cellphone video taken during that period shows an American B52 bomber, with Defendant Salah commenting: "Idiots, what is this you are displaying? All the world got killed by this U.S. Air Force airplane! You must remove it, otherwise I will remove it. There is no God but Allah." You can see more details in the Criminal Complaint. The post "Arizona Man Sentenced to Six Years in Prison for Plot Targeting Christian Churches" appeared first on Reason.com.

Debtors' prisons, evil schemes, and the Pottery Barn rule.

The keynote address from the "Gitlow v. New York at 100" symposium, held this year at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law; other papers from that symposium will be published here in the coming weeks.

11/28/1872: Justice Samuel Nelson resigns. Justice Samuel Nelson The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 28, 1872 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

What’s on your mind?

A nice piece, which I enjoyed and thought I'd pass along. As with all such things, it can't capture the whole picture, but it captures an important part of it, I think. You can see it on Persuasion, or (under a slightly different title) on Kasparov's Next Move; an excerpt: Democracy, freedom—politics, too. These are not ends in and of themselves. They are a vehicle for delivering human happiness and flourishing. That goal is what we're fighting for. The notion of a free society is abstract. Thanksgiving celebrates abundance, and abundance is tangible. You can taste it. Smell it. Hear it. The turkey and mashed potatoes on your plate, the chatter with loved ones, whom you're free to visit—these are the fruits of a free society…. Free societies deliver abundance. These days, there is a lot of doom and gloom about the United States across the political spectrum. I am not talking about America's current democratic and institutional crisis, which is indeed deathly serious. I am referring to the short-sighted ideological decay that is increasingly popular with radicals of all stripes; on the right, the perception of America as sinful, deviant, and overly tolerant. On the left, it is the view that America is criminal, colonial, illegitimate…. Americans would do well to discard these self-destructive narratives. It may be hard to describe what lofty concepts like democracy and freedom really mean, but you can see the rewards of those concepts all around you if you're willing to open your eyes. If Abraham Lincoln could find time for gratitude in the middle of a deadly Civil War, Americans today can too. If [Boris] Yeltsin [visiting the U.S. in 1989] could be so impressed by a grocery store many Americans might consider average, then you have something to be thankful for. I'll dispense with the caveat that America isn't perfect (what country is?). If you are thankful for something, then you have something you can fight for. The post Garry Kasparov, "What Thanksgiving Means to Me" appeared first on Reason.com.

Stopping all immigration processing for Afghan migrants is unjust and undermines rather than furthers the goal of combatting terrorism.

11/27/1964: WGCB carried a 15-minute broadcast by the Reverend Billy James Hargis as part of the "Christian Crusade" series. This broadcast gave rise to Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission (1969). The Warren Court (1969) The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 27, 1964 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

From yesterday's Oregon Supreme Court decision in State v. Cortes, written by Justice Bronson James: Defendant, who is houseless, is on probation and subject to the general conditions of probation provided for by Oregon law. Those conditions include the requirement that a probationer shall "[n]ot possess weapons, firearms or dangerous animals." Defendant's probation officer issued a probation violation report alleging that defendant had violated the general weapons condition when he reported to the probation office with a knife in his backpack. At the probation violation hearing, defendant claimed that, although it was a knife, it was a steak knife, and it was therefore not a weapon but a tool, an essential eating implement that defendant carried in his backpack by necessity because, being houseless, he carried all his worldly possessions upon his person. {The knife was nine inches long, and the blade was four-and-a-half inches in length and had a rounded tip.} The trial court rejected defendant's argument that the knife—even if it was a steak knife—was not a weapon for purposes of the probation statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. We allowed review to consider whether defendant violated the weapons condition in ORS 137.540(1)(j). The debate in this case might appear ontological in nature: What makes a weapon a weapon? What characteristics give an object weaponness? But, we need not resolve those deeper philosophical questions. Our task is more grounded; we are only called upon to decide what the Oregon legislature intended to be considered a weapon for purposes of ORS 137.540. Here, based on the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 137.540(1)(j), and considering maxims of constitutional avoidance, we hold that the legislature intended for the term "weapons," as used in that statute, to apply to instruments designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat or instruments that would reasonably be recognized as having substantially the same character, and not to tools or objects designed primarily for utility, even when those tools can be used as weapons under some circumstances. Based on that definition, we conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant had violated the weapons condition without first engaging in a factual inquiry about the knife at issue and making a factual determination as to whether it was a knife that was designed primarily for offensive or defensive combat, or one that would reasonably be recognized as having substantially the same character, as opposed to a knife designed primarily for utility…. The development of the probation statutes since 1931 provides several important contextual clues for interpreting the weapons provision in ORS 137.540(1). First, the purpose of the probation system is to promote a probationer's freedom and need for rehabilitation so long as those interests are consistent with public safety. Second, it is Oregon's policy to ensure that the probation system operates in a swift, certain, and consistent manner. To achieve that policy, the legislature has developed a system of general and specific conditions of probation with the goal of limiting the discretion of probation officers to interpret judgments while, at the same time, providing probationers with clear notice of what conduct is prohibited and required while under supervision. With that context in mind, it is unlikely that the legislature intended for "weapons" to mean literally anything capable of being used to inflict injury. Such a definition would capture a nearly endless number of objects and would give probation officers unreasonably broad authority to determine what objects constitute weapons. That result would deprive probationers of fair notice about what conduct would constitute a violation. Moreover, it would lead to arbitrary enforcement, with each probation officer determining individually whether a particular object is a weapon in a particular circumstance, as exemplified by the testimony of the probation officer in this case who, when asked to define a weapon, said it was "[a]nything that can cause me harm." … [And i]f the term "weapons" is defined by situational use, then virtually anything in the home can be a weapon when used in a particular manner. Defining a weapon in terms of how an object is used works well when evaluating past behavior, such as criminal statutes that apply to actions already undertaken. But probation conditions exist to regulate future behavior. A situational "use" definition applied to constructive possession makes it nearly impossible for probationers to predict what future behavior would, or would not, be prohibited. Further, it invites arbitrary enforcement that would vary between probation officers. For these reasons, we reject the state's definition of "weapons," in favor of a definition of "weapons" tied to the features of an object's design…. The sole question in this case is the legislative intent in using the term "weapons" in the general conditions of probation. Nothing in our decision today forecloses an individual court from constructing a special condition of probation for knives or other forms of potentially dangerous tools—such as, for example, a special condition prohibiting actual possession of any type of knife, regardless of design, outside the home, unless possessed for work purposes—as long as the record supports that such a condition is "reasonably related to the crime of conviction or the needs of the probationer for the protection of the public or reformation of the probationer, or both." … Justice Stephen Bushong, joined by Justice Christopher Garrett, dissented: Under ORS 137.540(1)(j), a probationer shall not "possess weapons, firearms or dangerous animals." The statute does not define "weapons," and, as the majority opinion points out, a knife can be used as a tool—a utensil that is used to eat or cut food—and as a weapon. I would distinguish between the two, not by focusing on whether the implement was designed for combat or reasonably recognized as having the same character, as the majority opinion concludes, but by examining the circumstances surrounding a probationer's possession…. Defendant possessed the knife in his backpack, with the handle sticking out, making it readily accessible to him by reaching back—without removing his backpack—and grabbing it. That suggests that he possessed the knife to use it as a weapon. The handle of the knife was wrapped in tape, making it easier for defendant to grab it quickly and hold it tightly, in a threatening way, if he thought he needed a weapon. Defendant's manner of possessing the knife suggests that he possessed it as a weapon because he intended to use it, if necessary, as a weapon. That also is how defendant's probation officer saw it. After seeing the knife handle sticking out of defendant's backpack, the probation officer thought that defendant was in possession of a "weapon" in violation of the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j). Based on the probation officer's testimony, the trial court determined as a factual matter that defendant had possessed a weapon in violation of that general condition of probation. Because there are sufficient facts in the record to support that determination, I would affirm. That does not mean that any possession of this knife would necessarily be a violation of the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j). For example, if defendant had possessed this knife in the bottom of his backpack, wrapped in a napkin with a fork and spoon alongside a cup and a plate, I would conclude as a factual matter that he possessed it as an eating utensil, not as a weapon. Similarly, a probationer who possessed a hammer in a toolbox alongside a wrench and a screwdriver on the way to his job at a construction site possessed the hammer as a tool, not as a weapon. A probationer who possessed a baseball bat in a duffel bag alongside a mitt, a baseball, cleats, and a baseball uniform on the way to a baseball field possessed the bat to play baseball, not to use it as a weapon. Under those circumstances, probation officers and courts should conclude that the probationer had not possessed a weapon in violation of the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j). But hammers and baseball bats, though not specifically designed for combat, can be used as weapons. The same is true of a knife that is not specifically designed for combat. The circumstances in which a probationer possessed such an implement can reveal that a probationer possessed it as a weapon. For example, a probationer holding a baseball bat or a hammer in his hand in a threatening manner as he walked towards a street brawl would be possessing the implement as a weapon. In my view, such a possession would violate the general condition of probation in ORS 137.540(1)(j), even if the probationer stopped short of using the implement to bludgeon someone…. Public defender Francis C. Gieringer represents Cortes. The post Knife with 4½" Blade and Rounded Tip Wasn't "Weapon" Forbidden by Probation Condition, Oregon Court Holds appeared first on Reason.com.

From last week's Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Smith v. State, written by Justice Scott Walker: Appellant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the trial court's mask mandate…. In Romero v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), … one of the State's key witnesses refused to testify without wearing a "disguise" consisting of "dark sunglasses, a baseball cap pulled down over his forehead, and a long-sleeved jacket with its collar turned up and fastened so as to obscure [his] mouth, jaw, and the lower half of his nose." This Court noted that "the presence requirement is motivated by the idea that a witness cannot 'hide behind the shadow' but will be compelled to 'look [the defendant] in the eye' while giving accusatory testimony." [The court in Romero also reasoned that, "Although the physical presence element might appear, on a superficial level, to have been satisfied by Vasquez's taking the witness stand, it is clear that Vasquez believed the disguise would confer a degree of anonymity that would insulate him from the defendant. The physical presence element entails an accountability of the witness to the defendant…. In the present case, accountability was compromised because the witness was permitted to hide behind his disguise." -EV] Although in Maryland v. Craig (1990), the Supreme Court [rejected a Confrontation Clause because it] determined that the testimony of a child through a one-way closed-circuit monitor was reliable even though the physical presence element was lacking, the facts in Craig are not analogous to Romero. "[U]nlike Craig, [Romero] also involve[d] a failure to respect a second element of confrontation: observation of the witness's demeanor." When more than two elements of confrontation are being compromised, this Court determined that the Confrontation Clause requirements can only be circumvented if the public policy interest being served is "truly compelling." We did not find the witness's fears compelling, noting differences between adults' fears and children's fears and the fact that the defendant already knew the witness's name and address…. The Confrontation Clause requires case-specific evidence showing an encroachment of the defendant's right to confrontation was necessary to further a public-policy interest for the encroachment to be allowed under the United States Constitution. Because a surgical mask affects the physical-presence element of the Confrontation Clause and the jury's ability to assess demeanor, the trial court was required to make case-specific showings of fact that the mask mandate was necessary to further a public-policy interest…. [T]he use of surgical masks in the case at bar … is a significant impediment to viewing facial expressions due to the coverage of both the nose and mouth …. A reversal of the conviction is warranted because (1) the trial court did not show case-specific evidence that the masks were necessary, and (2) the mask mandate was applied regardless of individual necessity…. [Moreover], the trial took place in January of 2023, after face masks were no longer required by the Supreme Court of Texas and after the Governor had issued an executive order prohibiting mask requirements…. Judge David Schenck, joined by Judges Kevin Yeary and Jesse McClure, dissented: This case poses the question of whether the trial court's policy requiring every person in the courtroom, including witnesses providing live testimony in the presence of jurors, to wear a mask violated Appellant's rights under the U.S. Constitution's Confrontation Clause. To be sure, the COVID-19 pandemic presented many courts with the same question concerning trials during the time in which state and national declarations of disaster were in effect; the answer to that question was uniform: masking requirements do not violate a defendant's confrontation rights. Now, this Court is presented with that question for a trial occurring post-pandemic. While the decision to require masks of all the trial's participants and observers was imprudent and (we are told) evidently political, I do not believe the interference with the juror's ability to observe witness demeanor somehow ripened into a Confrontation Clause violation…. The U.S Supreme Court has identified four elements that collectively ensure the right to confrontation: 1) physical presence; 2) oath; 3) cross-examination; and 4) observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. Craig. The "combined effect" of these distinct elements collectively "serve[ ] the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm …." Being different, they are not necessarily equal. It is physical presence of the witness, as opposed to any of the other elements alone or in combination, that anchors the Craig analysis and, in turn, any evaluation of a claim of deprivation. "[A] defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." "Although demeanor evidence is … of … high significance, it is nevertheless well settled that it is not an essential ingredient of the confrontation privilege …." While the demeanor of a witness is also significant, infringements on that aspect of confrontation alone typically will not impede the core interest in forcing witness accountability for his or her testimony or amount to a categorical denial of the face-to-face encounter so critical to confrontation. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held—or considered—whether disruption of the demeanor element would, on its own, constitute a violation of the confrontation right…. Accordingly, only the physical presence element triggers the Craig analysis…. Should the answer to the threshold issue of whether there is a denial of the face-to-face component of confrontation in the first place be no, the Craig analysis is simply not implicated…. [In this case], the witnesses were physically present in the courtroom during testimony, testified under oath, and were subject to cross-examination by counsel and observation by the jury throughout…. [T]he witnesses in this case were actually present in the courtroom before Appellant and within his scope of vision. Additionally, the jurors could assess witness credibility and demeanor by observing "body language" and "delivery." … "[T]he reliability of witness testimony" in this case "was otherwise assured; jurors were able to observe how witnesses moved, spoke, hesitated, and even cried," the witnesses were not disguised, their eyes were visible, and had no degree of anonymity due to the ability to remove the masks for identification. Sophie Bossart represents Smith. The post 2023 Criminal Trial Where Witnesses Wore Surgical Masks Violated Confrontation Clause appeared first on Reason.com.

A rare instance in which courts were willing to impose sanctions upon sanctionable conduct.

After this decision, rescinding this Biden Administration rule may be more difficult.

"A Nashville city councilman threatened to withdraw business from a law firm,  which served as the city's outside counsel, due to the position one of its attorneys took as the chair of the county election commission on a tax referendum."

11/26/1829: Justice Bushrod Washington dies. He was President George Washington's nephew. Justice Bushrod Washington The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 26, 1829 appeared first on Reason.com.

What’s on your mind?

The Plaintiffs argued the 2021 map was an unconstitutional gerrymander. How could reimposing the 2021 map actually redress their purported injuries?

If someone was prosecuted (and later pardoned) for being an unregistered foreign agent for Iran, is it defamatory to say he was prosecuted for "spying"?

I'd like to again solicit submissions to our peer-reviewed Journal of Free Speech Law, and mention one of our great advantages: We can publish quickly (by the standards of academic journals), if that's what you'd like. Our most recent articles, for instance, were published 3 to 5 months from when we received them, and that includes the time stemming from the authors revising their articles in various ways (which we certainly allow, if the author is willing to take the time). We have published articles as quickly as 2½ months after we received them, when the author has wanted to move fast. To my knowledge, many top student-edited journals are shut down for the Winter, and won't review manuscripts until February. That means the manuscripts probably wouldn't be published until the end of 2026, or even later. But if you submit to us now, and want to publish quickly, you can have the article out by February or March. There are other advantages as well: We offer anonymized feedback from the reviewers whether the article is accepted or rejected; many authors have told us this was very helpful. And when we accept article, it's edited by one of our Executive Editors (Jane Bambauer, Ash Bhagwat, or me), and many authors have likewise told us that the edits, by experienced free speech scholars, are quite useful. Some more details: The journal is now nearly five years old, and has published over 100 articles, including by Jack Balkin (Yale), Mark Lemley (Stanford), Jane Ginsburg (Columbia), Philip Hamburger (Columbia), Christopher Yoo (Penn), and many others—both prominent figures in the field and emerging young scholars, including ones who didn't have a tenure-track academic appointment. (This list doesn't include our reprinting others' symposia, which have also included many other top scholars, such as Robert Post, Mark Tushnet, Geoffrey Stone, Lee Bollinger, Jeremy Waldron, Danielle Citron, Genevieve Lakier, and more.) The articles have been cited so far in 13 court cases, over 400 articles, and over 100 briefs. And note that all the articles have only had four years or less to attract these citations. Please pass this along to friends or colleagues who you think might be interested. Note that the submissions don't compete for a limited number of slots in an issue or volume; we'll publish articles that satisfy our quality standards whenever we get them. All submissions must be exclusive to us, but, again, you'll have an answer within 14 days (though perhaps up to 21 days if it's over Thanksgiving, Christmas, or New Year's), so you'll be able to submit elsewhere if we say no. Please submit an anonymized draft, together with at https://freespeechlaw.scholasticahq.com/. A few guidelines: * Instead of a cover letter, please submit at most one page (and preferably just a paragraph or two) explaining how your article is novel. If there is a particular way of showing that (e.g., it's the first article to discuss how case X and doctrine Y interact), please let us know. * Please submit articles single-spaced, in a proportionally spaced font. * Please make sure that the Introduction quickly and clearly explains the main claims you are making. * Please avoid extended background sections reciting familiar Supreme Court precedents or other well-known matters. We prefer articles that get right down to the novel material (if necessary, quickly explaining the necessary legal principles as they go). * Each article should be as short as possible, and as long as necessary. * Like everyone else, we like simple, clear, engaging writing. * We are open to student-written work, and we evaluate it under the same standards applicable to work written by others. We publish: * Articles that say something we don't already know. * Articles with all sorts of approaches: doctrinal, theoretical, historical, empirical, or otherwise. * Articles dealing with speech, press, assembly, petition, or expression more broadly. * Generally not articles purely focused on the Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause, except if they also substantially discuss religious speech. * Articles about the First Amendment, state constitutional free speech provisions, federal and state statutes, common-law rules, and regulations protecting or restricting speech, or private organizations' speech regulations. * Articles about U.S. law, foreign law, comparative law, or international law. * Both big, ambitious work and narrower material. * Articles that are useful to the academy, to the bench, or to the bar (or if possible, to all three). * Articles arguing for broader speech protection, narrower speech protection, or anything else. The post Journal of Free Speech Law: Publish Your Article in a Few Months appeared first on Reason.com.