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squiblydoo.bsky.social
Squiblydoo
@squiblydoo.bsky.social
240 followers 200 following 64 posts
Malware Analyst; creator of debloat, certReport, CertCentral.org Debloat Discord: http://discord.gg/dvGXKaY5qr squiblydoo.blog
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Cert Central has an unauthenticated API endpoint to return the database as a csv: certcentral[.]org/api/download_csv

It used in CCCS' AssembyLine as a blacklist.

@securityaura.bsky.social
uses it for threat hunting github.com/SecurityAura...

Looking forward to see what others do with it.
Reposted by Squiblydoo
A team of journalists in Norway spent a year secretly monitoring a credit card fraud gang to uncover who's behind it and how they operate. Here's the story -- in English -- of how they unmasked Darcula and the crime-as-a-service software Magic Cat. www.nrk.no/dokumentar/x...
The scammers have tricked millions through text messages:
Who are they and how do they scam us?
www.nrk.no
Reposted by Squiblydoo
Scammers are happily abusing multiple platforms at once thanks to lack of controls.

Who's going to protect users here? Google? Facebook?
Reposted by Squiblydoo
If you manage #wordpress sites using #managewp, watch out for this #phishing campaign via #googleads.

-> menagewp[.]com (ad URL and redirect)

-> orion[.]manaqewp[.]com (phishing page)
Impostor certificate:
EV Code-signing certificate "Yurisk LLC", used to sign fake NordPass installer.

Abused and revoked within 1 week of issuance. Company registration says they transport freight.
Fake PuTTy, signed "Eptins Enterprises Llp"

Sets scheduled task "Security Updater" and checks into IP address: 185.196.10.127

Triage: tria.ge/250401-wnbad...

www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7ca...

@jeromesegura.com
Fake SCPToolkit uploaded to MB by aachum:

Signed EXE "jmutanen software Oy" loads an MSI and the real SCPToolkit as a decoy. Installs ScreenConnect: microsoftnet[.]ru

Files from signer: bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/j...

Zip with parts:
www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1df...
Signed DLL, 2/70 hits on VT? virustotal.com/gui/file/224...

Actually easy to see it downloads from PasteBin and excludes C:

I created a course with KC7Cyber
to showcase and educate: kc7cyber.com/modules/VT101

I like to promote it because I know details like these get looked over.
Dang. Black Basta spending $500 to run a campaign and $4,000 for the Extended Validation certificate. 🤯

Great to see the code-signing certificate abuse the other side. Great use of Cert Central: tying certificates BB talked about back to the actual malwares.
We recently got the opportunity to see the inner workings of the Black Basta ransomware gang 🕵️🔎 We examined how the ransomware gang used their skill & finances to abuse a core security concept: code-signing certificates.

Here's how to leverage this for your own defenses 🛡️ expel.com/blog/code-si...
Code-signing certificate abuse in the Black Basta chat leaks (and how to fight back)
Ransomware gang Black Basta's chats were recently leaked, proving how they abuse code-signing certificates. Here's how to defend against it.
expel.com
Signed malware "Webber Air Investments LLC"
First seen 23 days ago targeting YouTubers, rip.

Vidar C2: 95.217.30.53
bazaar.abuse.ch/browse/tag/W...
Reposted by Squiblydoo
Our SOC noticed that some attackers using the ClickFix and Fake Captcha technique are also providing text incase their payloads are read by AI or LLM.

Learn more about fake captchas: expel.com/blog/expel-q...
Ya'll will start seeing more files signed by Microsoft.
Please report them to centralpki@microsoft[.com or just tag me at a minimum, please.

Microsoft has been good at revoking them

This week I saw
Lumma Infostealer
QuasarRAT
CobaltStrike (C2: uuuqf[.]com)

www.virustotal.com/gui/file/401...
Fake MalwareBytes installer.
Installs Zoom as a decoy: tria.ge/250308-wyeqk...

Rhadamanthys, per VirusTotal's config extractor.
virustotal.com/gui/file/4c2...

C2: 185.33.87.209
Understanding the technique is important. This technique accounts for essentially 78% of bloated files (out of 1000).

Debloat handles 91% of examples but only PE files.
When attackers use this technique with other file types, you'll be on your own until debloat adds support.
Fake Zoom reaches out to Namecheap domain ZoomInstaller[.]com

Fake MagicApp also installs Zoom; reaches out to Github and Namecheap domain MagicVision[.]io

Both suspiciously over 100MB due to .NET resource.
tria.ge/250308-mqs4j...
tria.ge/250308-mpm6x...

Certificate reported.
Code-signing certs reported this morning:
BlackmoonBanker signed by trading company "福州隋德洛贸易有限公司"

Fake DeepSeek signed by pharma company "TRUONG LUU THUY PHARMA COMPANY LIMITED"

Fake games, installs uTorrent, signed by construction company "MASTER SGDN BAU GMBH"
Ah yes, the Austrian construction company that makes my favorite games.

www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e48...
I suspect that a lot of folk don't realize that a lot of the certificates Cert Central handles are for files that are not detected by any detection engine.

Today's example was a 1Password Setup application. The file downloads the real 1Password as a decoy

www.joesandbox.com/analysis/162...
Want experience doing malware analysis, categorizing threat actors, and other malware shaped things?

We need more individual contributors for Cert Central. DM or email admin at certcentral . org

As it turns out, we have a lot of malware to analyze.
Good to hear, I've been wondering about you guys. You 404Media folk have been hammering stuff out every day for the past few months.
I hope the rest of the team gets some rest too.