malmoeb.bsky.social
@malmoeb.bsky.social
Head of Investigations at InfoGuard AG - dfir.ch
Look at my tweet from February 2022. As simple as putting NG into the country field.
Guess what I found in this week's Business E-Mail Compromise? Successful logins from NG. Oh well..
Guess what I found in this week's Business E-Mail Compromise? Successful logins from NG. Oh well..
November 30, 2025 at 4:47 PM
Look at my tweet from February 2022. As simple as putting NG into the country field.
Guess what I found in this week's Business E-Mail Compromise? Successful logins from NG. Oh well..
Guess what I found in this week's Business E-Mail Compromise? Successful logins from NG. Oh well..
Reading a report from a recent Incident Response case from my teammate, Asger Strunk.
"It was observed that an unknown hostname “DESKTOP-LDIG48N” from the VPN DHCP IP address 192.168.128.149 made multiple failed login attempts using the username “admin” against various hosts within the network."
"It was observed that an unknown hostname “DESKTOP-LDIG48N” from the VPN DHCP IP address 192.168.128.149 made multiple failed login attempts using the username “admin” against various hosts within the network."
November 26, 2025 at 6:29 PM
Reading a report from a recent Incident Response case from my teammate, Asger Strunk.
"It was observed that an unknown hostname “DESKTOP-LDIG48N” from the VPN DHCP IP address 192.168.128.149 made multiple failed login attempts using the username “admin” against various hosts within the network."
"It was observed that an unknown hostname “DESKTOP-LDIG48N” from the VPN DHCP IP address 192.168.128.149 made multiple failed login attempts using the username “admin” against various hosts within the network."
I was reading an older report from CrowdStrike the other day:
"CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords." [1]
"CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords." [1]
November 25, 2025 at 9:40 AM
I was reading an older report from CrowdStrike the other day:
"CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords." [1]
"CrowdStrike was able to reconstruct the PowerShell script from the PowerShell Operational event log as the script’s execution was logged automatically due to the use of specific keywords." [1]
A customer sent malware over. The file magic was CART.. What's that? Turns out, something pretty cool.
"This is where CaRT (which stands for Compressed and RC4 Transport) comes in. CaRT is used to store and transfer malware, as well as its metadata.
"This is where CaRT (which stands for Compressed and RC4 Transport) comes in. CaRT is used to store and transfer malware, as well as its metadata.
November 24, 2025 at 3:23 PM
A customer sent malware over. The file magic was CART.. What's that? Turns out, something pretty cool.
"This is where CaRT (which stands for Compressed and RC4 Transport) comes in. CaRT is used to store and transfer malware, as well as its metadata.
"This is where CaRT (which stands for Compressed and RC4 Transport) comes in. CaRT is used to store and transfer malware, as well as its metadata.
I analyzed and recreated (a simpler version) of a PHP backdoor we detected in a recent Incident Response engagement. I used the backdoor to install an RMM agent on the compromised machine; the installed EDR did not raise a single alert.
November 17, 2025 at 8:09 AM
I analyzed and recreated (a simpler version) of a PHP backdoor we detected in a recent Incident Response engagement. I used the backdoor to install an RMM agent on the compromised machine; the installed EDR did not raise a single alert.
I love reading Incident Response reports from my colleagues. This one here from Matthieu Chatelan:
"Note that over 1700 lines (of risky sign-ins) were generated for this user account over the last 3 months.
"Note that over 1700 lines (of risky sign-ins) were generated for this user account over the last 3 months.
November 15, 2025 at 8:33 AM
I love reading Incident Response reports from my colleagues. This one here from Matthieu Chatelan:
"Note that over 1700 lines (of risky sign-ins) were generated for this user account over the last 3 months.
"Note that over 1700 lines (of risky sign-ins) were generated for this user account over the last 3 months.
Craig Rowland never disappoints 🥇
He is showing us cool tricks for finding inconsistencies in the output from different Linux commands, pointing to an active Kernel rootkit.
He is showing us cool tricks for finding inconsistencies in the output from different Linux commands, pointing to an active Kernel rootkit.
November 14, 2025 at 1:10 PM
Craig Rowland never disappoints 🥇
He is showing us cool tricks for finding inconsistencies in the output from different Linux commands, pointing to an active Kernel rootkit.
He is showing us cool tricks for finding inconsistencies in the output from different Linux commands, pointing to an active Kernel rootkit.
This is wild. From a recent IR engagement led by my teammate Florian Scheiber:
"The investigation showed that the attacker first compromised the Administrator’s personal Gmail account, [email protected]. Those credentials appeared in a combolist leaked on 2 June 2025.
"The investigation showed that the attacker first compromised the Administrator’s personal Gmail account, [email protected]. Those credentials appeared in a combolist leaked on 2 June 2025.
November 14, 2025 at 9:49 AM
This is wild. From a recent IR engagement led by my teammate Florian Scheiber:
"The investigation showed that the attacker first compromised the Administrator’s personal Gmail account, [email protected]. Those credentials appeared in a combolist leaked on 2 June 2025.
"The investigation showed that the attacker first compromised the Administrator’s personal Gmail account, [email protected]. Those credentials appeared in a combolist leaked on 2 June 2025.
taskhostw.exe writes a PE file (see the classic TVqQAAMAAAA sequence there) inside the UCPD\DR registry key?
Microsoft implemented a driver-based protection to block changes to http/https and .pdf associations by 3rd party utilities, the so-called UCPD driver (UserChoice Protection Drive).
Microsoft implemented a driver-based protection to block changes to http/https and .pdf associations by 3rd party utilities, the so-called UCPD driver (UserChoice Protection Drive).
November 12, 2025 at 5:33 PM
taskhostw.exe writes a PE file (see the classic TVqQAAMAAAA sequence there) inside the UCPD\DR registry key?
Microsoft implemented a driver-based protection to block changes to http/https and .pdf associations by 3rd party utilities, the so-called UCPD driver (UserChoice Protection Drive).
Microsoft implemented a driver-based protection to block changes to http/https and .pdf associations by 3rd party utilities, the so-called UCPD driver (UserChoice Protection Drive).
This slide also didn't make the cut. Yes, anyone who has spent more than five minutes on a Hack The Box machine will know pspy, but what about my blue-team colleagues?
November 11, 2025 at 7:53 AM
This slide also didn't make the cut. Yes, anyone who has spent more than five minutes on a Hack The Box machine will know pspy, but what about my blue-team colleagues?
The following slide hasn't made it into my "Fantastic cleartext password" talk, however, it's still a good one to share 🤓
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
November 10, 2025 at 2:37 PM
The following slide hasn't made it into my "Fantastic cleartext password" talk, however, it's still a good one to share 🤓
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
"This simple tool logs usernames and passwords from authentication attempts against an OpenSSH server you control.
Two of my teammates published artifacts on the Velociraptor Exchange this week 💪
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
November 8, 2025 at 9:49 AM
Two of my teammates published artifacts on the Velociraptor Exchange this week 💪
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
Yann Malherbe released several VHDX artifacts, as described in his detailed blog post. [1]
Dropping ngrok in a ZIP file onto disk results in the file being removed and an alert being raised, but installing ngrok via winget works just fine? 🤔🤷♂️
November 2, 2025 at 7:12 PM
Dropping ngrok in a ZIP file onto disk results in the file being removed and an alert being raised, but installing ngrok via winget works just fine? 🤔🤷♂️
This one here is a goodie! A customer called us because they had several incidents where the system time "magically" jumped days, sometimes even months, back and forth (see screenshot). You can imagine the issues inflicted by this behavior. So the question was.. Cyber? Attacker? Misconfiguration?
November 1, 2025 at 12:56 PM
This one here is a goodie! A customer called us because they had several incidents where the system time "magically" jumped days, sometimes even months, back and forth (see screenshot). You can imagine the issues inflicted by this behavior. So the question was.. Cyber? Attacker? Misconfiguration?
So, I wrote about "Behavior:Win32/SuspRclone" before. [1]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
October 31, 2025 at 10:07 AM
So, I wrote about "Behavior:Win32/SuspRclone" before. [1]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
"This behavioral monitoring signature gets triggered if the file Rclone.exe has been observed residing in a suspicious folder on a device." [2]
Just when you think you know your way around Linux.. binfmt_misc: Hold my beer.
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
Today I learned: binfmt_misc | dfir.ch
Technical blog by Stephan Berger (@malmoeb)
dfir.ch
October 30, 2025 at 11:43 AM
Just when you think you know your way around Linux.. binfmt_misc: Hold my beer.
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
dfir.ch/posts/today_...
Today I learned: SeManageVolumePrivilege
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
October 25, 2025 at 7:32 AM
Today I learned: SeManageVolumePrivilege
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
While reading the HTB write-up for Certificate, I learned about SeManageVolumePrivilege. [1]
A video by Grzegorz Tworek goes into great detail about how to abuse SeManageVolumePrivilege.[2]
Coming back to Maester! Do you know about the awesome Conditional Access What-If tests? [1]
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
October 24, 2025 at 8:22 AM
Coming back to Maester! Do you know about the awesome Conditional Access What-If tests? [1]
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
The first image is from the official documentation and shows how easily you can build your own test scenario. The second image shows the results from a tenant where I ran the test.
What is Maester? [1]
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
October 23, 2025 at 6:14 AM
What is Maester? [1]
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
Maester is a PowerShell-based test automation framework that helps you stay in control of your Microsoft security configuration. Such a cool tool - test details can be filtered by passed, failed, and skipped. Failed tests come with detailed recommendations on how to do better.
Today I learned: Using diskshadow to fetch the NTDS.dit. As mentioned several times, I love reading the HTB writeups from 0xdf because I always learn something new. Like here [1]:
October 22, 2025 at 5:10 AM
Today I learned: Using diskshadow to fetch the NTDS.dit. As mentioned several times, I love reading the HTB writeups from 0xdf because I always learn something new. Like here [1]:
Lately, I’ve talked about (alternative) forensic artifacts where the retention time might be higher than your classical Security Event Logs, or might not be the first artifact to be deleted in an "anti-forensics" operation by a threat actor.
October 21, 2025 at 5:58 AM
Lately, I’ve talked about (alternative) forensic artifacts where the retention time might be higher than your classical Security Event Logs, or might not be the first artifact to be deleted in an "anti-forensics" operation by a threat actor.
In various business email compromise (BEC) cases, we later discovered that although the customer had set up a conditional access (CA) policy to enforce multi-factor authentication, mistakes had been made during the implementation of said policies.
October 20, 2025 at 6:18 AM
In various business email compromise (BEC) cases, we later discovered that although the customer had set up a conditional access (CA) policy to enforce multi-factor authentication, mistakes had been made during the implementation of said policies.
We recently took over an APT investigation from another forensic company. While reviewing analysis reports from the other company, we discovered that the attackers had been active in the network for months and had deployed multiple backdoors.
October 19, 2025 at 7:29 AM
We recently took over an APT investigation from another forensic company. While reviewing analysis reports from the other company, we discovered that the attackers had been active in the network for months and had deployed multiple backdoors.
Second story from a recent coffee break with my pentest colleague. During a retest for a client, they discovered the same ESC1 vulnerability they had reported before. Why is that dangerous and also super critical?
October 18, 2025 at 6:46 AM
Second story from a recent coffee break with my pentest colleague. During a retest for a client, they discovered the same ESC1 vulnerability they had reported before. Why is that dangerous and also super critical?
1/ Coffee break with one of our pentesters. He casually mentioned to me, "The last attack simulation was pretty cool. We used gowitness (a website screenshot utility written in Golang, to generate screenshots of web interfaces) to find internal services [1].
October 17, 2025 at 6:45 AM
1/ Coffee break with one of our pentesters. He casually mentioned to me, "The last attack simulation was pretty cool. We used gowitness (a website screenshot utility written in Golang, to generate screenshots of web interfaces) to find internal services [1].