Jacob Boswall
@jboswall.bsky.social
110 followers 48 following 160 posts
BBC journalist tracking jihadist groups worldwide // aspiring beekeeper Still also at https://x.com/Boswall_Jacob
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jboswall.bsky.social
In terms of propaganda, IS released four feature videos about its #Africa branches during the quarter - a notable increase in the frequency of this type of long-form propaganda

These showcased the activities of the #Sahel, ISWAP, ISCAP and Mozambique branches.
jboswall.bsky.social
Meanwhile, IS's #Mozambique branch almost doubled activities compared to the previous quarter, whilst also widening attacks northwards and southwards, including into Nampula province, south of #CaboDelgado
jboswall.bsky.social
In #DRC, ISCAP stepped up violence against Christian civilians in September, possibly exploiting ongoing instability as the #Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continued their insurgency
jboswall.bsky.social
#Nigeria-focused ISWAP attacks dropped in Q3, as assaults on well-fortified military positions – a hallmark of its activity earlier this year – became highly infrequent.

ISWAP attacks this quarter are on a par with Central Africa branch (ISCAP) and Mozambique branch
jboswall.bsky.social
IS Sahel claimed an especially large clash with #JNIM, allegedly killing 70 JNIM fighters. Alongside other reported clashes, this points to continuing tensions between the jihadist rivals, especially in northern Burkina Faso
jboswall.bsky.social
In the Sahel, AQ's JNIM re-focused its attacks on #Mali, with more incidents in the country in September than in #BurkinaFaso.

JNIM is increasingly focusing on commercial targets, announcing a blockade on the south-western Kayes town and international commercial routes in early September
jboswall.bsky.social
There were continued high-casualty attacks by IS's #Somalia branch, featuring on Naba's front page of al-Naba six weeks in a row

IS propaganda framed the killing of a senior commander as a "major blow" to the efforts by #Puntland forces to clear the Al Miskad mountains of IS
jboswall.bsky.social
It’s that time of year again. BBC Monitoring's jihadist media team just published its data-driven quarterly report on jihadism in sub-Saharan #Africa for Q3 2025

Each quarter we look at the key developments in the five main African conflict zones where jihadist groups operate
jboswall.bsky.social
This video apparently shows a #JNIM spox warning Malians in Bambara against helping the military, to comply with JNIM as blockade enters 6th week

Note unusual media branding: "al-Fath Channel" (Chaine al-Fath), apparently a new - or little known - media outlet carrying messages in local languages
jboswall.bsky.social
It's not typical for JNIM's official mouthpiece, al-Zallaqa, to circulate such footage immediately. The caption specifically draws attention to the location of the attack, in a clear attempt to emphasise the group's ability to attack with impunity, even on major routes into Bamako
jboswall.bsky.social
Following its deadly ambush on the main road between Bamako and Segou in #Mali on 1 Oct, #JNIM circulated footage from the scene showing several bodies, apparently Malian soldiers
jboswall.bsky.social
Last week I spoke to @johnsimpsonnews.bsky.social on BBC2's Unspun World about Ahmed al-Sharaa's appearance at the UN, #Syria's reintegration into the international and MENA regional community, and prospects for the future Syrian social contract
jboswall.bsky.social
Despite the rise in attacks, #JNIM casualty rates in #Mali tend to be much lower than in Burkina Faso, possibly reflecting the relative vulnerability of VDPs in #Burkina. The average number of casualties in Burkina Faso throughout 2025 was 4.2 per attack. In Mali, it was only 1.5
jboswall.bsky.social
The numbers don't include attacks on non-military targets (eg fuel tankers, commercial entreprises) which continue to go unclaimed in JNIM's official media outlets - although they are referenced elsewhere in the group's media, in videos circulated locally in local dialects, especially Bambara
jboswall.bsky.social
For the first time in many months, #JNIM claimed more attacks in #Mali than in #BurkinaFaso so far in September, reflecting the group's strategic shift to the country since approximately June
jboswall.bsky.social
JNIM announced on 3 September it was blockading the cities of Kayes and Nioro-du-Sahel, home to about 130,000 and 50,000 people respectively in a significant escalation in its efforts to strangle the capital #Bamako of fuel and other imported goods
jboswall.bsky.social
Videos circulating appear to show #JNIM's Sunday attack on fuel tankers in Mali originating from Senegal
jboswall.bsky.social
- Nearly 80% of Mali's gold, its main resource, is produced in Kayes

- 30% of land imports, especially fuel and cereals, pass through National Road 1 from Dakar to Bamako
jboswall.bsky.social
- Kayes was Mali's first administrative region, created by Law No. 60-3-ALRS of June 7, 1960

- The region remains a strategic economic hub, contributing the second largest share of Mali's GDP after Bamako
jboswall.bsky.social
The detonation - in the "Aguelhok valley" - killed or wounded an unspecified number of "enemy forces" and destroyed a military truck, according to JNIM. Photos depict destroyed vehicles, with militants standing triumphantly atop or beside them
jboswall.bsky.social
Breaking: #JNIM claims "significant" IED attack on a Malian army convoy accompanied by Russian Africa Corps troops near the northern city of Kidal, #Mali. Statement says attack took place on 9 Sept.
jboswall.bsky.social
In recent months, the majority of JNIM's training propaganda has been from Mali, coinciding with an uptick in attacks in the country since approx. May/June. Graph of attacks collected by BBCM below