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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Liviu Horovitz @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social · 8d

AI could fuel a tech arms race between proliferation-enabling & detection-enhancing tools - favoring the former & straining conventional monitoring & verification methods, which poses risks to nonproliferation, analyze @herzogsm.bsky.social & David Allison @socriskanalysis.bsky.social 8/10

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility

A robust nonproliferation regime has contained the spread of nuclear weapons to just nine states. Yet, emerging and disruptive technologies are reshaping the landscape of nuclear risks, presenting a ....

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Liviu Horovitz @liviuhorovitz.bsky.social · 8d

SATCOM & Bundeswehr, Russia’s upgraded missiles, Iran's nuclear program, DPRK & South Korea, AI & tech race & more in this week’s STAND newsletter, a project by @swp-intsecurity.bsky.social, on recent news & analyses to better #underSTAND #nuclear #space #deterrence & #threats 1/10

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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

1/7
How might AI enable the (non)proliferation of nuclear weapons? In a new #OpenAccess article in Risk Analysis (@socriskanalysis.bsky.social), Dave Allison & I explore this question. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility

A robust nonproliferation regime has contained the spread of nuclear weapons to just nine states. Yet, emerging and disruptive technologies are reshaping the landscape of nuclear risks, presenting a ...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Project on Managing the Atom @managingtheatom.bsky.social · 12d

MTA alum David Allison & visiting scholar @herzogsm.bsky.social have published one of the first systematic studies looking at the connection between AI & nuclear (non)proliferation. See the thread below!

Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

1/7
How might AI enable the (non)proliferation of nuclear weapons? In a new #OpenAccess article in Risk Analysis (@socriskanalysis.bsky.social), Dave Allison & I explore this question. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility

A robust nonproliferation regime has contained the spread of nuclear weapons to just nine states. Yet, emerging and disruptive technologies are reshaping the landscape of nuclear risks, presenting a ...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

7/7
Our goal is not to predict the future, but to promote thinking about how emerging technologies affect proliferation outcomes. Follow the link to the simulation tool in the article to test your own model values/assumptions & observe how proliferation & verification interact.

Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

6/7
We find that early investments in advanced detection tech have big effects in offsetting the potential for AI-enhanced nuclear breakout.

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

5/7
To capture this uncertainty we simulate 6 scenarios. They range from AI having only limited proliferation relevance to AI replicating nuclear weapon design teams. We also model detection's current innovation pace & compare to “moonshot” investments in monitoring/verification.

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

4/7
Detection leads, but verification has historically evolved step-wise, often in response to crises. Commercially-driven dual-use technologies with WMD applications are currently evolving faster, with uncertain endpoints. Could we run into the situation depicted in this plot?

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

3/7
Think of nuclear breakout as a race between would-be proliferators & actors engaged in monitoring & verification. We model this race: AI-aided trajectories for proliferation-enabling vs. detection-enhancing technologies.

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

2/7
States will need a lot more than a ChatGPT subscription to build a bomb. But we examine how growing AI capabilities may reduce breakout time & change latent proliferators’ calculations about their likelihood of covert success.

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 15d

1/7
How might AI enable the (non)proliferation of nuclear weapons? In a new #OpenAccess article in Risk Analysis (@socriskanalysis.bsky.social), Dave Allison & I explore this question. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility

A robust nonproliferation regime has contained the spread of nuclear weapons to just nine states. Yet, emerging and disruptive technologies are reshaping the landscape of nuclear risks, presenting a ...

onlinelibrary.wiley.com

1 5 5

Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · 24d

Atomic Backfires: When Nuclear Policies Fail is now available for pre-order from @mitpress.bsky.social! The thread below describes the premise of the volume and its contributors. mitpressbookstore.mit.edu/book/9780262...

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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Project on Managing the Atom @managingtheatom.bsky.social · 25d

Explore @herzogsm.bsky.social's most recent contributions to the field here: www.belfercenter.org/person/steph...

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Sep 11

4/4
Austin Cooper, "The Argentella scandal: why French officials did not make Corsica a nuclear test site in 1960," www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

The Argentella scandal: why French officials did not make Corsica a nuclear test site in 1960

Top French officials made plans in early 1960 to transform an abandoned silver mine in Corsica, called the Argentella Massif, into an underground site for nuclear explosions. By June 1960, they had...

www.tandfonline.com

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Sep 11

3/4
@karldewey1.bsky.social, "Poisonous affairs: Russia’s evolving use of poison in covert operations," www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Poisonous affairs: Russia’s evolving use of poison in covert operations

The August 2020 poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexi Navalny once again put the spotlight on Russia’s poison program. However, although individual poisonings may draw considerable coverage,...

www.tandfonline.com

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Sep 11

2/4
@lydiawachs.bsky.social, "Russian nuclear roulette? Elites and public debates on nuclear weapons in Moscow after Ukraine," www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

Russian nuclear roulette? Elites and public debates on nuclear weapons in Moscow after Ukraine

How has Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine influenced domestic debates on nuclear strategy in Russia? Western scholars and analysts have voiced concern that, as Russia’s conventional capabilit...

www.tandfonline.com

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Sep 11

1/4
Congratulations to Nonproliferation Review McElvany Award winners for their articles! @lydiawachs.bsky.social (grand prize), @karldewey1.bsky.social (runner-up), & Austin Cooper (honorable mention). Links to #openaccess articles in subsequent posts below.
nonproliferation.org/article-on-r...

Article on Russian nuclear strategy during Ukraine war takes top McElvany Award

An article providing key insights into Russian nuclear strategy during the first 18 months of the war in Ukraine has won the grand prize.

nonproliferation.org

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Sep 5

Was delighted to be at KAIST yesterday for the U.S.-Korea International Workshop on Research Security and Integrity. We had very productive conversations about safeguarding research ecosystems against R&D misappropriation with incredibly welcoming and knowledgeable hosts!

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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Matthew Bunn @matthew-bunn.bsky.social · Aug 29

Thoughtful analysis of the perspectives from Europe, Russia, and Iran, and of a narrow potential path to accord from @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social. In addition, she's been posting a number of useful items on action in Iran's parliament, the text of Russia's draft UNSC resolution, etc.

Nicole Grajewski @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social · Aug 28

The Countdown to Prevent Another Iranian Nuclear Crisis Just Began

My thoughts on snapback for @carnegieendowment.org carnegieendowment.org/emissary/202...

The Countdown to Prevent Another Iranian Nuclear Crisis Just Began

Three European countries triggered the snapback mechanism for sanctions on Tehran. Now, Washington needs to step up.

carnegieendowment.org

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Aug 25

It's even more fun when LLMs are generous enough to invent fictitious co-authors of the article you never wrote.

Kristian Ulrichsen @kristianulrichsen.bsky.social · Aug 23

I'm peer reviewing a manuscript for a reputable publisher and came across fake references which must be AI-generated - including to an article attributed to me which sounds fascinating but which I never wrote.

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Reposted by Stephen Herzog

Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Aug 22

1/13
In a new report for @vertic.bsky.social, I take a hard look at the challenge that highly latent nuclear states present to irreversibility in nuclear disarmament. Summary and relevant tables and figures below. Read the report here: www.vertic.org/wp-content/u...

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Aug 22

13/13
I address these questions and more in the report! www.vertic.org/wp-content/u...

www.vertic.org

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Aug 22

12/13
How much confidence is enough, and will states be willing to pay for it? And which states should be the ones to do so?

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Aug 22

11/13
And there is a trade-off between verification success and costs, as the former asymptotically approaches 100% at increasingly greater expense but never quite gets there.

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Stephen Herzog @herzogsm.bsky.social · Aug 22

10/13
This will, of course, be expensive and is also a matter of political will. But the framework is, in my view, feasible to implement.

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