Charles S. Peirce
Charles Sanders Peirce was an American scientist, mathematician, logician, and philosopher who is sometimes known as "the father of pragmatism".… more
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The tendency to regard continuity, in the sense in which I shall define it, as an idea of prime importance in philosophy conveniently may be be termed synechism. The present paper is intended chiefly to show what synechism is, and what it leads to.
To "postulate" a proposition is no more than to hope it is true.
Suppose it be "postulated": that does not make it true, nor so much as afford the slightest rational motive for yielding it any credence. It is as if a man should come to borrow money, and when asked for his security, should reply he "postulated " the loan.
Well, if that is the best that can be said for it, the belief is doomed.
When I have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every fact in the universe is precisely determined by law, the first answer has usually been that the proposition is a "presupposition" or postulate of scientific reasoning.
Reposted by Charles S. Peirce
of my use of ‘experience’ are, for all practical purposes, insurmountable. I would substitute the term ‘culture’ because with its meanings as now firmly established it can fully and freely carry my philosophy of experience.”
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Reposted by Charles S. Peirce, Alan Richardson
“Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would entitle the book Culture and Nature and the treatment of specific subject-matters would be correspondingly modified. I would abandon the term ‘experience’ because… the historical obstacles which prevented understanding...
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By an object, I mean anything that we can think, i.e. anything we can talk about.
The entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs.
Reposted by Charles S. Peirce
Revolutionary achievements in the arts, in the sciences, and in moral and political thought typically occur when somebody realizes that two or more of our vocabularies are interfering with each other, and proceeds to invent a new vocabulary to replace both.
CIS p.12
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Vocabulary
CIS p.12
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Vocabulary
If I have learned a formula in gibberish which in any way jogs my memory so as to enable me in each single case to act as though I had a general idea, what possible utility is there in distinguishing between such a gibberish and formula and an idea?
But I now define a pseudo-continuum as that which modern writers on the theory of functions call a continuum. But this is fully represented by [...] the totality of real values, rational and irrational…
They regard an object as it is in itself as such (quale); for example, as horse, tree, or man. These are absolute terms.
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Now logical terms are of three grand classes.The first embraces those whose logical form involves only the conception of quality,and which therefore represent a thing simply as "a —."These discriminate objects in the most rudimentary way,which does not involve any consciousness of discrimination.
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Thus, twenty skillful hypotheses will ascertain what 200,000 stupid ones might fail to do.
Reposted by Charles S. Peirce
...But it also knows that its juvenile assumption of power and achievement is not a dream to be wholly forgotten. It implies a unity with the universe that is to be preserved.”
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Reposted by Charles S. Peirce
“[A] mind that has opened itself to experience and that has ripened through its discipline knows its own littleness and impotencies; it knows that its wishes and acknowledgments are not final measures of the universe whether in knowledge or in conduct, and hence are, in the end, transient....
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Reposted by Charles S. Peirce
To say that we should drop the idea of truth as out there waiting to be discovered is not to say that we have discovered that, out there, there is no truth.
'Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity' p.8
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
'Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity' p.8
#Pragmatism
#Rorty
#Truth
That the rule of induction will hold good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object of the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead.
It will be seen that pragmatism is not a Weltanschauung but is a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas clear.
The study of philosophy consists, therefore, in reflexion, and pragmatism is that method of reflexion which is guided by constantly holding in view its purpose and the purpose of the ideas it analyzes, whether these ends be of the nature and uses of action or of thought.
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis
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Have pleasure and pain the same sort of constitution, or are they contrasted in this respect, pleasure arising upon the formation or strengthening of an association by resemblance, and pain upon the weakening or disruption of such a habit or conception?
Among more purely psychological questions, the nature of pleasure and pain will be likely to attract attention. Are they mere qualities of feeling, or are they rather motor instincts attracting us to some feelings and repelling others?
To ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might result from the truth of that conception—and the sum of these consequences constitute the entire meaning of the conception.
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
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Pragmatism. The opinion that metaphysics is to be largely cleared up by the application of the following maxim for attaining clearness of apprehension: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
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…the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
How many people there are who are incapable of putting to their own consciences this question, "Do I want to know how the fact stands, or not?"