Zack Grant
@zackgp94.bsky.social
Postdoctoral Researcher at the Nuffield Politics Research Centre (Uni of Oxford).
I research public opinion and party competition in Europe. Especially interested in political implications of AI + tech change; ethnic fragmentation; the environment.
I research public opinion and party competition in Europe. Especially interested in political implications of AI + tech change; ethnic fragmentation; the environment.
Panel model looks at new/updated exposure experiences on regulation support, controlling for prior attitudes/exposure. Suggest a short-term (reactive?) adjustment in demand for AI reg. in response to perceiving greater threats at work. So potential for demand for gov reg. to rise in future… 11/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
Panel model looks at new/updated exposure experiences on regulation support, controlling for prior attitudes/exposure. Suggest a short-term (reactive?) adjustment in demand for AI reg. in response to perceiving greater threats at work. So potential for demand for gov reg. to rise in future… 11/16
Link between AI regulation support and obj. workplace exposure + subj. AI-pessimism robust to controls. Trad. automation (RTI) exposure, while widely used in polsci, does not predict attitudes. Note obj. AI exposure still predictive net of ‘subjective’ beliefs about personal AI cost/benefits… 10/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
Link between AI regulation support and obj. workplace exposure + subj. AI-pessimism robust to controls. Trad. automation (RTI) exposure, while widely used in polsci, does not predict attitudes. Note obj. AI exposure still predictive net of ‘subjective’ beliefs about personal AI cost/benefits… 10/16
Among those *feeling* pos / neg exposed, an interesting asymmetry. While net support highest among those saying AI worsens own job prospects (+59), there is no diff. between those expecting no impact (+38) vs. those expecting benefits (+41). Even AI optimists do not oppose idea of gov. reg. 9/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
Among those *feeling* pos / neg exposed, an interesting asymmetry. While net support highest among those saying AI worsens own job prospects (+59), there is no diff. between those expecting no impact (+38) vs. those expecting benefits (+41). Even AI optimists do not oppose idea of gov. reg. 9/16
But how important is personal AI job exposure? First, let’s look at support by quartiles of ‘objective’ AI exposure. Net support rises from around +31 to +51 points from least (Q1) to most (Q4) exposed. Not much techno-libertarianism among those at AI forefront. Again, robust to D/P controls. 8/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
But how important is personal AI job exposure? First, let’s look at support by quartiles of ‘objective’ AI exposure. Net support rises from around +31 to +51 points from least (Q1) to most (Q4) exposed. Not much techno-libertarianism among those at AI forefront. Again, robust to D/P controls. 8/16
How popular is gov. regulation of AI in general? Quite! If we look at *all* British workers, net support (support minus opposition) rose from +35 to +43 points between Oct 2024 and Spring 2025 — though many people remain ambivalent/undecided. 7/16.
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
How popular is gov. regulation of AI in general? Quite! If we look at *all* British workers, net support (support minus opposition) rose from +35 to +43 points between Oct 2024 and Spring 2025 — though many people remain ambivalent/undecided. 7/16.
Workers aren’t clueless about likely AI impacts either. Use Felten et al. (2021) to map exposure of 364 jobs (from budget analysts to dancers), we find that ~50% of those in the most AI-exposed jobs (Q4) think it’ll affect them v 1/5 in least-exposed (Q1). Robust to demog/polit (D/P) controls. 6/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
Workers aren’t clueless about likely AI impacts either. Use Felten et al. (2021) to map exposure of 364 jobs (from budget analysts to dancers), we find that ~50% of those in the most AI-exposed jobs (Q4) think it’ll affect them v 1/5 in least-exposed (Q1). Robust to demog/polit (D/P) controls. 6/16
First: how do current workers *feel* that AI will affect them? Interestingly, while nearly half of workers think that it won’t make a difference, rising numbers feel personally threatened by AI (from 23 to 28%, 2024-2025). Personal AI-optimists are a much smaller group (1-in-10 in all waves). 5/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
First: how do current workers *feel* that AI will affect them? Interestingly, while nearly half of workers think that it won’t make a difference, rising numbers feel personally threatened by AI (from 23 to 28%, 2024-2025). Personal AI-optimists are a much smaller group (1-in-10 in all waves). 5/16
An important Q! Traditionally, tech replaced routine, working-class, non-graduate jobs. Now, the roles most exposed to AI — e.g. budget analysts, actuaries, graphic designers, paralegals — are professional. If econ. insecurity spreads to the middle classes, could upend politics. 3/16
October 28, 2025 at 11:35 AM
An important Q! Traditionally, tech replaced routine, working-class, non-graduate jobs. Now, the roles most exposed to AI — e.g. budget analysts, actuaries, graphic designers, paralegals — are professional. If econ. insecurity spreads to the middle classes, could upend politics. 3/16