Lecturer at Princeton University
Partner at Armitage International
Former Pentagon and White House staffer
Wrangler of children
This world will be more complex and dangerous. But American strategists must accept the world they have created and craft realistic approaches to protect US interests in this evolving region.
rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publica...
This world will be more complex and dangerous. But American strategists must accept the world they have created and craft realistic approaches to protect US interests in this evolving region.
rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publica...
If Washington's position in Asia erodes, how would the United States react if some of its allies and partners were to pursue independent nuclear options?
If Washington's position in Asia erodes, how would the United States react if some of its allies and partners were to pursue independent nuclear options?
If the United States adopts an maritime balancing strategy, what would this imply for US allies and partners (like Thailand and South Korea) on the Asian continent?
If the United States adopts an maritime balancing strategy, what would this imply for US allies and partners (like Thailand and South Korea) on the Asian continent?
But if the US disengages outside Northeast Asia and then stands aside on Taiwan, would this effectively erode what is left of the US position across the entire Asian region?
But if the US disengages outside Northeast Asia and then stands aside on Taiwan, would this effectively erode what is left of the US position across the entire Asian region?
Will US leaders support or oppose Asian powers (especially India and Indonesia) playing bigger roles in their sub-regions?
Will US leaders support or oppose Asian powers (especially India and Indonesia) playing bigger roles in their sub-regions?
Rather than asking whether these constraints can be reversed, observers should start thinking about how US policy and the Indo-Pacific region will adapt.
I see four basic implications that raise hard questions for American strategists:
Rather than asking whether these constraints can be reversed, observers should start thinking about how US policy and the Indo-Pacific region will adapt.
I see four basic implications that raise hard questions for American strategists:
They are more fundamental. They are due to shifting US views and foreign perceptions of America.
They are more fundamental. They are due to shifting US views and foreign perceptions of America.
Even close allies are reshaping their engagement with Washington to protect their independence in the face of US pressure and unpredictability.
Even close allies are reshaping their engagement with Washington to protect their independence in the face of US pressure and unpredictability.
Both parties abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Now the United States will be sidelined as regional economic integration accelerates.
Both parties abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Now the United States will be sidelined as regional economic integration accelerates.
This is due to both America's global responsibilities and the American people’s waning appetite for additional overseas spending/engagement.
This is due to both America's global responsibilities and the American people’s waning appetite for additional overseas spending/engagement.
Going forward, US strategy in Asia will face three constraints, which will require us to rethink our whole approach to the region.
Going forward, US strategy in Asia will face three constraints, which will require us to rethink our whole approach to the region.
Pillars:
✅ Security
❌ Prosperity
❌ Good governance
Sub-regions:
✅ Northeast Asia
❌ Southeast Asia
❌ South Asia
❌ Oceania/Pacific Islands
Pillars:
✅ Security
❌ Prosperity
❌ Good governance
Sub-regions:
✅ Northeast Asia
❌ Southeast Asia
❌ South Asia
❌ Oceania/Pacific Islands
1) Distracted and failed to devote sufficient resources to Asia
2) Unable to implement a positive regional trade agenda
3) Too often viewed the rest of the region through the lens of competition with China
1) Distracted and failed to devote sufficient resources to Asia
2) Unable to implement a positive regional trade agenda
3) Too often viewed the rest of the region through the lens of competition with China
Pillars:
- Security
- Prosperity
- Good Governance
Sub-Regions:
- Northeast Asia
- Southeast Asia
- South Asia
- Oceania/Pacific Islands
Pillars:
- Security
- Prosperity
- Good Governance
Sub-Regions:
- Northeast Asia
- Southeast Asia
- South Asia
- Oceania/Pacific Islands
Wise. Fierce. Courageous. And always a lover of gossip.
He was larger than life. Hard to believe he’s gone.
www.pbs.org/wgbh/america...
Wise. Fierce. Courageous. And always a lover of gossip.
He was larger than life. Hard to believe he’s gone.
www.pbs.org/wgbh/america...