Amélie Koran (webjedi)
@webjedi.bsky.social
Security Hobo, Itinerant Technologist, Policy Anti-Wonk, Former Senior Fellow at The Atlantic Council, Teller of Tales for Darknet Diaries #91 (and other venues). All opines are my own. RS/Fav/Follow≠Endorsement.
Any particular day that worked well… I may try to be organizationally inclined.
April 22, 2025 at 8:01 PM
Any particular day that worked well… I may try to be organizationally inclined.
Well, I’m down with Pho… as for organizing… somebody will have to give me items and preferences… it’s my first time for #RSAC (weird, I know)
April 22, 2025 at 4:06 PM
Well, I’m down with Pho… as for organizing… somebody will have to give me items and preferences… it’s my first time for #RSAC (weird, I know)
Weird, because as a Fed who was in various technology roles, including a CIO and CTO role that we, indeed, used SQL among many other database query languages.
A simple contract examination will highlight products purchased, and source code analysis will bring to light.
Wait, they didn’t do that?!
A simple contract examination will highlight products purchased, and source code analysis will bring to light.
Wait, they didn’t do that?!
February 12, 2025 at 11:43 AM
Weird, because as a Fed who was in various technology roles, including a CIO and CTO role that we, indeed, used SQL among many other database query languages.
A simple contract examination will highlight products purchased, and source code analysis will bring to light.
Wait, they didn’t do that?!
A simple contract examination will highlight products purchased, and source code analysis will bring to light.
Wait, they didn’t do that?!
A friend of mine worked with that effort at USDS too… shame.
February 4, 2025 at 12:40 AM
A friend of mine worked with that effort at USDS too… shame.
Bro… seemed like Chad was picking a fight… I mean, he’s spicy
February 4, 2025 at 12:39 AM
Bro… seemed like Chad was picking a fight… I mean, he’s spicy
Well, he’s supposedly a lawyer and former Federal prosecutor.
www.popehat.com/c/about
Also, pretty sure the DOGE folks haven’t been fully cleared, not even with a Public Trust clearance for CUI. I get cleared pretty fast, and I don’t believe I got in under two weeks.
www.popehat.com/c/about
Also, pretty sure the DOGE folks haven’t been fully cleared, not even with a Public Trust clearance for CUI. I get cleared pretty fast, and I don’t believe I got in under two weeks.
The Popehat Report
A Complaint About Law, Liberty, and Leisure.
www.popehat.com
February 4, 2025 at 12:19 AM
Well, he’s supposedly a lawyer and former Federal prosecutor.
www.popehat.com/c/about
Also, pretty sure the DOGE folks haven’t been fully cleared, not even with a Public Trust clearance for CUI. I get cleared pretty fast, and I don’t believe I got in under two weeks.
www.popehat.com/c/about
Also, pretty sure the DOGE folks haven’t been fully cleared, not even with a Public Trust clearance for CUI. I get cleared pretty fast, and I don’t believe I got in under two weeks.
Very on brand for ya! TY!
February 3, 2025 at 3:42 PM
Very on brand for ya! TY!
Also a constituent who knows how these attacked agencies work and has a clue as to cybersecurity and IT ops… if you need some ideas on defensive tactics, give me a call.
Otherwise get to work and stop this - you’re the other branch of three in Federal government…
Otherwise get to work and stop this - you’re the other branch of three in Federal government…
February 3, 2025 at 3:50 AM
Also a constituent who knows how these attacked agencies work and has a clue as to cybersecurity and IT ops… if you need some ideas on defensive tactics, give me a call.
Otherwise get to work and stop this - you’re the other branch of three in Federal government…
Otherwise get to work and stop this - you’re the other branch of three in Federal government…
They should not. Just because they work for part of EOP/OMB does not give them carte blanche in agency systems, where many bureaus and offices are segmented, and some classified as national security systems with stringent access requirements. These lackeys are 100% not cleared by normal means.
February 3, 2025 at 3:41 AM
They should not. Just because they work for part of EOP/OMB does not give them carte blanche in agency systems, where many bureaus and offices are segmented, and some classified as national security systems with stringent access requirements. These lackeys are 100% not cleared by normal means.
...and I say this as a co-founder of USDS in the Summer of 2014.
February 3, 2025 at 1:27 AM
...and I say this as a co-founder of USDS in the Summer of 2014.
USDS was an arm that was created in 2014 out of the WH's OSTP and OMB OFCIO.
It was funded via the ITOR budget, and IIRC, at last check had a budget of $80m.
It has the fastest hiring process in EOP, with Schedule A & Special Hiring Authority capability.
This is the quickest way to onboard & pay.
It was funded via the ITOR budget, and IIRC, at last check had a budget of $80m.
It has the fastest hiring process in EOP, with Schedule A & Special Hiring Authority capability.
This is the quickest way to onboard & pay.
February 3, 2025 at 1:25 AM
USDS was an arm that was created in 2014 out of the WH's OSTP and OMB OFCIO.
It was funded via the ITOR budget, and IIRC, at last check had a budget of $80m.
It has the fastest hiring process in EOP, with Schedule A & Special Hiring Authority capability.
This is the quickest way to onboard & pay.
It was funded via the ITOR budget, and IIRC, at last check had a budget of $80m.
It has the fastest hiring process in EOP, with Schedule A & Special Hiring Authority capability.
This is the quickest way to onboard & pay.
---> Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency <---
In September 2019, background investigations were transferred from OPM's NBIB to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.
In September 2019, background investigations were transferred from OPM's NBIB to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.
February 3, 2025 at 1:22 AM
---> Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency <---
In September 2019, background investigations were transferred from OPM's NBIB to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.
In September 2019, background investigations were transferred from OPM's NBIB to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.
Make note, OPM has determinations, but the clearance process, after the 2014 series of hacks, was moved to the joint OPM/DoD NBIB, and then later to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency as of September 2019.
February 3, 2025 at 1:21 AM
Make note, OPM has determinations, but the clearance process, after the 2014 series of hacks, was moved to the joint OPM/DoD NBIB, and then later to Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency as of September 2019.