Our analysis at the country-year level shows that the reform led to greater national newspaper coverage of the WTO TRIPS, which in turn raised public awareness.

Using network statistics to estimate the state preference distributions on key topics, we find that, after the reform, the WTO Secretariat is more likely to issue reports on polarized topics in negotiations, using accountability-enhancing words.

How does transparency affect the behavior of international bureaucrats tasked with facilitating negotiations? In new work with Sojun Park in the Review of International Organizations (doi.org/10.1007/s115..., it’s open access!), we provide an answer in the context of the WTO.

The home-state effect is particularly apparent in countries where the US exports the most in dollar values, and in industries that export final goods. We find that the past career path and future career aspirations of ambassadors can shape how the benefits of diplomacy are distributed domestically.

My ambassador paper with Shu Fu is out in @worldpolitics.bsky.social!

Ambassadors promote domestic exports to a host country and represent the interests of their home country at large. However, are trade benefits equally distributed domestically? 🧵
muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/articl...