Mikhail Komin
@kominmo.bsky.social
Political analyst, Russia expert (elites, bureaucracy, government data, policy-making process). Editor at Novaya Gazeta Europe; Research Fellow at CEPA
8/ Together, these dynamics reshape the edges - not the centre - of the EP. The pro-Kremlin bloc is bigger, louder, and more ideologically diverse. But it remains fragmented and isolated, able to signal Moscow’s narratives — yet still far from being able to shape EU policy.
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
8/ Together, these dynamics reshape the edges - not the centre - of the EP. The pro-Kremlin bloc is bigger, louder, and more ideologically diverse. But it remains fragmented and isolated, able to signal Moscow’s narratives — yet still far from being able to shape EU policy.
7/ My personal “favourite” example in SMER is Ľuboš Blaha — the most emblematic case. His long-standing alignment with Moscow isn't symbolic: he travelled to Ru, spoke at MGIMO, met with the head of the SVR, and built a full political persona around anti-Western narratives.
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
7/ My personal “favourite” example in SMER is Ľuboš Blaha — the most emblematic case. His long-standing alignment with Moscow isn't symbolic: he travelled to Ru, spoke at MGIMO, met with the head of the SVR, and built a full political persona around anti-Western narratives.
6/ But the most dramatic transformation comes from Robert Fico’s SMER.
Its enlarged group now ranks among the most reliably pro-Russian actors in the entire EP — a sharp contrast with its more ambiguous positioning in earlier years.
Its enlarged group now ranks among the most reliably pro-Russian actors in the entire EP — a sharp contrast with its more ambiguous positioning in earlier years.
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
6/ But the most dramatic transformation comes from Robert Fico’s SMER.
Its enlarged group now ranks among the most reliably pro-Russian actors in the entire EP — a sharp contrast with its more ambiguous positioning in earlier years.
Its enlarged group now ranks among the most reliably pro-Russian actors in the entire EP — a sharp contrast with its more ambiguous positioning in earlier years.
5/ Even stronger shift is visible in AfD. The delegation is larger, and with the new far-right blocs providing ideological cover, AfD’s voting record becomes deeper red.
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
5/ Even stronger shift is visible in AfD. The delegation is larger, and with the new far-right blocs providing ideological cover, AfD’s voting record becomes deeper red.
4/ RN’s voting pattern tells the story. In 2022–2024, the party often softened its stance — abstaining or splitting its vote on key resolutions.
But after the 2024 election, RN returned to a more assertive line, voting against Ukraine-support measures
But after the 2024 election, RN returned to a more assertive line, voting against Ukraine-support measures
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
4/ RN’s voting pattern tells the story. In 2022–2024, the party often softened its stance — abstaining or splitting its vote on key resolutions.
But after the 2024 election, RN returned to a more assertive line, voting against Ukraine-support measures
But after the 2024 election, RN returned to a more assertive line, voting against Ukraine-support measures
3/ The emergence of two new far-right groups in this Parliament has clearly shifted the dynamics. With stronger allies and greater parliamentary weight, traditional Kremlin-leaning parties have become noticeably bolder in how they vote on Russia- and Ukraine-related resolutions.
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
3/ The emergence of two new far-right groups in this Parliament has clearly shifted the dynamics. With stronger allies and greater parliamentary weight, traditional Kremlin-leaning parties have become noticeably bolder in how they vote on Russia- and Ukraine-related resolutions.
2/ Among the most striking results: Germany’s BSW dominates the top of the pro-Kremlin list. All 3 leading MEPs - and 4 of the party’s 5 members overall - appear in our Top-20, underscoring that Kremlin-friendly voting comes not only from the far right but also from the far left.
November 24, 2025 at 11:15 PM
2/ Among the most striking results: Germany’s BSW dominates the top of the pro-Kremlin list. All 3 leading MEPs - and 4 of the party’s 5 members overall - appear in our Top-20, underscoring that Kremlin-friendly voting comes not only from the far right but also from the far left.
8/ In short, Russia’s global vision is not about partnership but hierarchy:
a world where sovereignty means separation, justice means balance, and history itself is the ultimate source of legitimacy.
a world where sovereignty means separation, justice means balance, and history itself is the ultimate source of legitimacy.
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
8/ In short, Russia’s global vision is not about partnership but hierarchy:
a world where sovereignty means separation, justice means balance, and history itself is the ultimate source of legitimacy.
a world where sovereignty means separation, justice means balance, and history itself is the ultimate source of legitimacy.
7/ ➡️ Temporal dimension:
Russia’s future is written through its past. The mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” (WWII) and imperial continuity replaces modernisation with restoration — reclaiming lost status rather than imagining progress.
Russia’s future is written through its past. The mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” (WWII) and imperial continuity replaces modernisation with restoration — reclaiming lost status rather than imagining progress.
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
7/ ➡️ Temporal dimension:
Russia’s future is written through its past. The mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” (WWII) and imperial continuity replaces modernisation with restoration — reclaiming lost status rather than imagining progress.
Russia’s future is written through its past. The mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” (WWII) and imperial continuity replaces modernisation with restoration — reclaiming lost status rather than imagining progress.
6/➡️ Distributive dimension:
The Kremlin imagines a world of several “centres of power” where the West is only one pole. China dominates economically — but Russia sees itself as an ideological pole, offering moral leadership against Western “decadence”.
The Kremlin imagines a world of several “centres of power” where the West is only one pole. China dominates economically — but Russia sees itself as an ideological pole, offering moral leadership against Western “decadence”.
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
6/➡️ Distributive dimension:
The Kremlin imagines a world of several “centres of power” where the West is only one pole. China dominates economically — but Russia sees itself as an ideological pole, offering moral leadership against Western “decadence”.
The Kremlin imagines a world of several “centres of power” where the West is only one pole. China dominates economically — but Russia sees itself as an ideological pole, offering moral leadership against Western “decadence”.
5/ ➡️ Institutional dimension:
Russia seeks to reshape global governance through regional and non-Western formats — the EAEU, CSTO, BRICS+ and the SCO. These institutions form concentric circles of influence, projecting a “multipolar” balance centred on Moscow.
Russia seeks to reshape global governance through regional and non-Western formats — the EAEU, CSTO, BRICS+ and the SCO. These institutions form concentric circles of influence, projecting a “multipolar” balance centred on Moscow.
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
5/ ➡️ Institutional dimension:
Russia seeks to reshape global governance through regional and non-Western formats — the EAEU, CSTO, BRICS+ and the SCO. These institutions form concentric circles of influence, projecting a “multipolar” balance centred on Moscow.
Russia seeks to reshape global governance through regional and non-Western formats — the EAEU, CSTO, BRICS+ and the SCO. These institutions form concentric circles of influence, projecting a “multipolar” balance centred on Moscow.
4/
Moscow frames this as a defence of “civilisational sovereignty”. And here we continue my report for @ecfr.eu on how Russia presents itself as a state-civilisation leading the global anti-colonial struggle for the right to define what is really fair & just ecfr.eu/publication...
Moscow frames this as a defence of “civilisational sovereignty”. And here we continue my report for @ecfr.eu on how Russia presents itself as a state-civilisation leading the global anti-colonial struggle for the right to define what is really fair & just ecfr.eu/publication...
Late-stage Putinism: The war in Ukraine and Russia’s shifting ideology
The Kremlin is creating a new, more unified ideology, which it is disseminating among the Russian population and using to attract global south countries to a new conservative alliance.
ecfr.eu
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
4/
Moscow frames this as a defence of “civilisational sovereignty”. And here we continue my report for @ecfr.eu on how Russia presents itself as a state-civilisation leading the global anti-colonial struggle for the right to define what is really fair & just ecfr.eu/publication...
Moscow frames this as a defence of “civilisational sovereignty”. And here we continue my report for @ecfr.eu on how Russia presents itself as a state-civilisation leading the global anti-colonial struggle for the right to define what is really fair & just ecfr.eu/publication...
3/
➡️ Normative dimension:
We trace how Russia’s concept of sovereignty has expanded far beyond law or borders — now meaning cultural, digital, technological, and even nuclear independence. It’s about control and reframing of every sphere where the West once set standards.
➡️ Normative dimension:
We trace how Russia’s concept of sovereignty has expanded far beyond law or borders — now meaning cultural, digital, technological, and even nuclear independence. It’s about control and reframing of every sphere where the West once set standards.
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
3/
➡️ Normative dimension:
We trace how Russia’s concept of sovereignty has expanded far beyond law or borders — now meaning cultural, digital, technological, and even nuclear independence. It’s about control and reframing of every sphere where the West once set standards.
➡️ Normative dimension:
We trace how Russia’s concept of sovereignty has expanded far beyond law or borders — now meaning cultural, digital, technological, and even nuclear independence. It’s about control and reframing of every sphere where the West once set standards.
2/ The book applies a new shared analytical framework to study how major powers imagine world order — from the US, China and India to Turkey and Russia. Each chapter looks at four dimensions of a country’s “vision order”: normative, institutional, distributive and temporal.
November 7, 2025 at 12:35 AM
2/ The book applies a new shared analytical framework to study how major powers imagine world order — from the US, China and India to Turkey and Russia. Each chapter looks at four dimensions of a country’s “vision order”: normative, institutional, distributive and temporal.
3/ As I told The Economist, during last 2-3 years “all sources of power are war-related". In today’s Russia, political survival depends on how visibly you serve the war effort. Every ambition must wear or at least pretends to wear the camouflage.
October 26, 2025 at 6:53 PM
3/ As I told The Economist, during last 2-3 years “all sources of power are war-related". In today’s Russia, political survival depends on how visibly you serve the war effort. Every ambition must wear or at least pretends to wear the camouflage.
2/ Figures like Anna Tsivilyova (Putin’s alleged cousin), media tycoon Konstantin Malofeev, and war veteran Artyom Zhoga now rise fast — symbols of a “wartime elite” built on loyalty, faith and combat experience. Old elite groups must find, how they can be usiful for Putin's war.
October 26, 2025 at 6:53 PM
2/ Figures like Anna Tsivilyova (Putin’s alleged cousin), media tycoon Konstantin Malofeev, and war veteran Artyom Zhoga now rise fast — symbols of a “wartime elite” built on loyalty, faith and combat experience. Old elite groups must find, how they can be usiful for Putin's war.
10/ The Kremlin’s plan is simple: summon these reservists for two-month “special training,” then deploy them to Ukraine — avoiding a politically risk. This legal tweak doesn’t just expand Russia’s capacity to fight — it expands its ability to pretend it hasn’t mobilized again.
October 14, 2025 at 12:37 AM
10/ The Kremlin’s plan is simple: summon these reservists for two-month “special training,” then deploy them to Ukraine — avoiding a politically risk. This legal tweak doesn’t just expand Russia’s capacity to fight — it expands its ability to pretend it hasn’t mobilized again.
9/ The known BARS battalions together count 25–30,000 fighters. Reports from regions between 2019–2021 mention 400–1,000 reservists each — a few dozen thousand nationwide. Even if we add everyone formally signed into the reserve, the real total is unlikely above 100,000 people.
October 14, 2025 at 12:37 AM
9/ The known BARS battalions together count 25–30,000 fighters. Reports from regions between 2019–2021 mention 400–1,000 reservists each — a few dozen thousand nationwide. Even if we add everyone formally signed into the reserve, the real total is unlikely above 100,000 people.
8/ Officially, the State Duma now cites 2 million reservists. But this number is fiction. rtvi.com/news/chtoby...
«Чтобы там были все»: зачем власти хотят призывать резервистов на спецсборы
Законопроект Минобороны, который устанавливает условия привлечения резервистов к выполнению задач в мирное время, нацелен на расширение "спектра применения этой категории личного состава". Об этом заявил RTVI глава комитета Госдумы по обороне Андрей Картаполов.
rtvi.com
October 14, 2025 at 12:37 AM
8/ Officially, the State Duma now cites 2 million reservists. But this number is fiction. rtvi.com/news/chtoby...
7/ After 2022, the Defense Ministry used BARS as a legal framework for volunteer recruitment outside Wagner. By 2023, BARS was largely replaced by regional volunteer battalions. Some elite Russians joined “showcase” units of БАРС, like "Каскад" to get the svo participant status.
October 14, 2025 at 12:37 AM
7/ After 2022, the Defense Ministry used BARS as a legal framework for volunteer recruitment outside Wagner. By 2023, BARS was largely replaced by regional volunteer battalions. Some elite Russians joined “showcase” units of БАРС, like "Каскад" to get the svo participant status.
6/ By 2021, a new component in this system appeared — the Combat Army Reserve of the Country (БАРС) and some BARS units have fought in Ukraine already for years
www.bbc.com/russian/new...
www.bbc.com/russian/new...
«Армия на полставки». Кто управляет российскими нерегулярными формированиями, воюющими в Украине? Исследование Би-би-си - BBC News Русская служба
Би-би-си рассказывает о том, как устроены система резервистов БАРС и ЧВК «Редут» — два главных рекрутинговых проекта Минобороны России, через которые на фронт отправляют ветеранов войны в Донбассе, казаков, ультраправых, депутатов, футбольных фанатов, экс-заключенных и простых россиян.
www.bbc.com
October 14, 2025 at 12:37 AM
6/ By 2021, a new component in this system appeared — the Combat Army Reserve of the Country (БАРС) and some BARS units have fought in Ukraine already for years
www.bbc.com/russian/new...
www.bbc.com/russian/new...