15) Battery projects show both the potential and risks of industrial policy. Europe’s production footprint is taking shape, even if some projects won’t cross the finish line. Setbacks like Northvolt aren’t systemic failures - but Asian firms will dominate the EU battery landscape in the medium run.

12) The gap has not gone unnoticed by competitors, most notably Chinese BEV makers. While these have so far pursued a margin-over-volume strategy in Europe and face EU tariffs, they are well-placed to step through the door EU carmakers are leaving open.

10) This lag is not mainly about charging points or range. Yes, gaps remain across the EU and sustained policy support is needed. But EU-wide capacity growth has recently outpaced BEV uptake – and, together with battery advances, is steadily eroding the reasons for range anxiety.

9) Second: Attributing Europe’s stuttering BEV transition solely to reluctant consumers misses the point - and risks inviting strategic complacency.

With EU carmakers losing ground in China, boosting BEV uptake at home is critical. Yet Europe has recently trailed global growth.

7) What changed? China pivoted rapidly toward electrification, backed by expansive industrial policy. By the end of 2024, over 50% of new sales were BEVs, PHEVs, and EREVs - a shift EU firms, slow to adapt, lagged.

What was once a reliable profit engine has become a looming liability.

6) Booming Chinese demand for premium cars amplified this model. In 2024, China still accounted for almost a ~1/3 of VW, Mercedes, and BMW global sales.

But the market is shifting fast: German brands’ market share in China dropped from 24% in 2019 to just 15% in 2024, with VW overtaken by BYD.

5) France shed ~50% of car manufacturing jobs between 2008 and 2024. Italy’s vehicle output fell >60% since 2000.

In contrast, German carmakers thrived by integrating production with Central and Eastern Europe, pairing cost-efficient CEE plants with high-value R&D and premium production at home.

4) First: standing still means falling further behind.

The idea of a “stable” status quo ignores long-term structural trends reshaping Europe’s auto sector. Failure to adapt to such shifts comes at significant costs – as shown by the gradual decline of automotive strongholds France and Italy.

11) The Just Transition Fund (JTF), the EU’s key tool for navigating affected regions through the transition, primarily targets former fossil fuel regions. This leaves EIM-dependent regions with insufficient tailored EU support for their unique transition challenges.

9) Survey data with @tabouchadi.bsky.social @markuskollberg.bsky.social & @nilsredeker.bsky.social from FR, DE, and PL underscore this:

EIM workers, especially lower-paid ones, are significantly more concerned about job loss due to the green transition than workers in other sectors.

6) Third, wage premiums are a key barrier to the green transition. EIM jobs pay above the national average and the overall manufacturing sector, likely reflecting sectors’ profitability and union strength. These premiums discourage workers from moving to lower-paying jobs, complicating job mobility.

5) Second, skill profiles of EIM workers pose transition hurdles. Jobs are often held by mid-skilled male workers in rural areas, who are less likely to join training programs than those in other sectors, complicating their ability to acquire the skills needed to navigate the green transition.

4) What exactly are the problems?

First, EIM sectors are highly concentrated - not only between member states but also in regional hubs. In regions of Germany, Slovenia, Sweden or the Visegrád countries, EIM jobs have anchored local economies, meaning the green transition’s impact will be uneven.

Headlines of job cuts and factory closures at steel- and automakers reveal a deeper challenge: the transition of Europe’s manufacturing base

In our new paper, @ankehassel.bsky.social, @sofiagomez.bsky.social, @kweil.bsky.social & I argue for a reconfigured EU approach to support workers & regions🧵

The EU Parliament has elected Von der Leyen's new Commission, set to take office on Dec 1.

370 MEPs voted in favor - 31 fewer than for VdL's own confirmation in June.

Given defections from the ranks of her informal coalition (EPP, S&D, Renew), votes from ECR (33) and Greens (27) proved decisive.