Our analysis shows that the ECB's reputation management during widening climate interventions involves three frames: prudence, promotion, and strategic ambiguity. Using these, the ECB practices reputational pragmatism to navigate diverse expectations, conflicting priorities, and mitigate risks

We draw on bureaucratic reputation theory to examine the climate engagement of the ECB.Utilising a three-fold frame analysis, we examine the ECB’s communication about its green agenda, complemented by interview data from stakeholders.

Amidst climate change, central banks' roles have broadened through widening interventions, offering new prospects but also reputational risks. Understanding how these risks shape banks' behaviour—preserving existing reputations, fostering new ones, or integrating both—is still lacking.

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The study is supported by two research projects by the Dutch National Science Foundation:

- VI.Veni.191R.078. (Principal Investigator: @dovilerimkute.bsky.social )
- VI.Vidi.201.128 (Principal Investigator: @jorisvandervoet.bsky.social )

(5) Our interviewees explain that these patters are strongly driven by reputational considerations.

In particular, accusations of technical misconduct threaten the core of EU agencies' credibility and authority.

(4) Media salience has a direct and strong positive effect on bureaucratic responsiveness. 

We provide new insight by showing that negative media attention in particular strengthens responsiveness to demands about technical and moral organizational conduct.

(3) Relative to demands about moral (mis)conduct by political principals, citizens' moral demands evoke higher bureaucratic responsiveness.

In the words of one respondent:

(2) Our analysis reveals that particular stakeholders can most forcefully voice demands concerning specific aspects of agency conduct, in particular:

- Technical demands by the Parliament
- Performative demands by the Commission
- Legal demands by national agencies

Findings:

(1) We find that bureaucrats are most responsive to demands exercised by their political principals (the European Parliament and the European Commission), as well as to demands that receive adverse media attention.

We use Discrete Choice Experiments to establish causal effects of demands' characteristics on bureaucratic responsiveness, and rely on interviews to inform the theoretical mechanisms that drive these effects. We leverage a sample of top-level bureaucrats at EU agencies.

Integrating theories of political control and bureaucratic reputation, we argue that responsiveness depends on demands'
- Source: which stakeholder exercises the demand?
- Content: which aspect of agency conduct is addressed?
- Salience: is adverse media attention present?