Mikhail Komin
@kominmo.bsky.social
42 followers 43 following 26 posts
Political analyst, Russia expert (elites, bureaucracy, government data, policy-making process). Editor at Novaya Gazeta Europe; Research Fellow at CEPA
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kominmo.bsky.social
10/ The Kremlin’s plan is simple: summon these reservists for two-month “special training,” then deploy them to Ukraine — avoiding a politically risk. This legal tweak doesn’t just expand Russia’s capacity to fight — it expands its ability to pretend it hasn’t mobilized again.
kominmo.bsky.social
9/ The known BARS battalions together count 25–30,000 fighters. Reports from regions between 2019–2021 mention 400–1,000 reservists each — a few dozen thousand nationwide. Even if we add everyone formally signed into the reserve, the real total is unlikely above 100,000 people.
kominmo.bsky.social
7/ After 2022, the Defense Ministry used BARS as a legal framework for volunteer recruitment outside Wagner. By 2023, BARS was largely replaced by regional volunteer battalions. Some elite Russians joined “showcase” units of БАРС, like "Каскад" to get the svo participant status.
kominmo.bsky.social
5/ They keep civilian jobs but must report for duty in wartime (under Matila Law, not svo), receiving small monthly payments — 12–46,000 rubles (150-500 USD) depending on region. This system of these "reservists" was formalized in 2015, but the recruitment process was slow.
kominmo.bsky.social
4/ The second category is so calle the "mobilization human reserve" — citizens who sign contracts with the Defense Ministry to stay on standby.
www.consultant.ru/document/co...
kominmo.bsky.social
3/ "Resource group" was the pool used for the 2022 mobilization — at least on paper. In practice, draft notices were handed out at random, as the registry data was chaotic. The new “database” of all draft-eligible Russians was meant to fix this, but implementation remains patchy.
kominmo.bsky.social
2/ The Ru MoD claims that Russia has “two groups of the reservists.” In fact, it’s closer to two and a half.

The first is the so called "mobilization human resource" — everyone who has ever served, trained at a milit. department, or fits minor legal criteria. Around 25 mil ppl.
kominmo.bsky.social
4/ Krasnov hasn’t hidden his frustration. His rush of lawsuits looks like an attempt to cement his legacy before the door closes. And as a consolation, Putin handed him a broad mandate to shake up Russia’s judiciary — beyond just targeting Viktor Momotov. www.kommersant.ru/doc/8060222
Отели запутались в мантии
Прокуроры добиваются конфискации миллиардных активов у председателя Совета судей России
www.kommersant.ru
kominmo.bsky.social
3/ But this success upset Putin’s balance of power. The Kremlin doesn’t want one security agency growing too influential. So Krasnov was moved to the Supreme Court —and replaced with the low-profile Alexander Gutsan, expected to restore the office’s modest role as it was under Yurii Chaika
kominmo.bsky.social
2/ In 5 years as Prosecutor General, Krasnov turned a one of the weakest siloviki institution into a power player — thanks to sweeping new powers to seize assets after 2022. Over 500 companies lost property worth nearly 4 trillion rubles.
kominmo.bsky.social
9/ By moving against Zapesotsky now, Krasnov signals that even long-time loyalists are not immune. Putin periodically rebalances his power system, curbing figures who have grown too entrenched — even those with personal loyalty stretching back decades.
kominmo.bsky.social
7/ Zapesotsky nurtured his image as close to Putin, publishing tributes like this 2013 ode portraying him as Sobchak’s true administrator: “When the mayor was absent, Putin ran the city… even when he was present, Putin often held the reins.
www.kommersant.ru/doc/2299344
Не сотвори себя кумиром
Подробнее на сайте
www.kommersant.ru
kominmo.bsky.social
4/ By the 1996 election, Zapesotsky was effectively Sobchak’s field operator: mobilizing union branches and young voters. Formally just a “trusted representative,” in practice he acted as a political technologist shaping the campaign’s ground game.
kominmo.bsky.social
3/ In the 1990s he was part of Anatoly Sobchak’s team. Though never holding an official post, he built Sobchak’s grassroots network through trade unions — and positioned himself as an expert on youth culture (even defending a dissertation on discos in 1986 www.gup.ru/uni/rektor/...
kominmo.bsky.social
3/ Even more fragile is Russia’s icebreaker program. The Kremlin dreams of building a super-icebreaker with a nuclear power unit. But deadlines now stretch to 2030 — and the odds of it ever sailing are close to zero.
kominmo.bsky.social
2/ Sanctions rarely match early Western expectations, but in the Arctic they sting. Projects like Arctic LNG-2 were forced to pause production after 2024 sanctions on LNG carriers. Timelines keep slipping.